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Abstract 
Sprinkler trade offs are clauses in the approved documents that allow various 
reductions in passive protection, maximum fire cell areas or maximum path lengths 
where an approved sprinkler system is present. 
Sprinkler trade offs have been present in New Zealand since they were introduced 
into NZS 1900 Chapter 5 in its 12th amendment in 1978. They have been 
progressively added and to NZS 1900 Chapter 5 and more recently to the Approved 
Documents of the New Zealand Building Code, up to the final ammendment in 
December 1995. 
By conducting an analysis of the approved documents and overseas building codes, a 
risk analysis and a cost benefit analysis this report concludes that sprinkler trade off 
clauses are a valuable tool in ensuring fire safety in this country. If the clauses are 
utilised the protection will be economical over 30 years and not endanger the 
occupants of the buildings or their contents. 
The level of trade offs is presently set at a level that may be considered a bare 
minimum to ensure safety in the event of a sprinkler failure. 
In specific situations where property protection may be lowered by the removal of 
some passive systems, it may be prudent for the owner to not use all the permitted 
trade offs, especially if the building contents are valuable or considered vital to 
business. 
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1. Introduction 
Sprinkler trade offs are clauses in the approved documents that allow various 
reductions in passive protection, maximum fire cell areas or maximum path lengths 
where an approved sprinkler system is present. 
Sprinkler trade offs have been present in New Zealand since they were introduced 
into NZS 1900 in its 12th amendment in 1978. They have been progressively added 
and to NZS 1900 Chapter 5 and more recently to the Approved Documents of the 
New Zealand Building Code, up to the final ammendment in December 1995. 
Although these clauses are well established and frequently utilised very little has 
been written on how these clauses are justified and, in the event of a fire, how the 
structure is expected to react. To meet the requirements of the New Zealand 
Building Code the safety of the occupants, the safety of Fire Service staff and the 
safety of other property must be guaranteed. By conducting various forms of 
analysis this report hopes to comment on whether these basic requirements have 
been fulfilled and look further to determine how these clauses effect property 
protection. 
1.1. Method 
There are many effects the trade off clauses have on the construction and renovation 
of buildings in this country, by looking at all of these effects this report hopes to 
develop a well balanced analysis of the clauses. 
The initial study consists of a literature review in which previous attempts to analyse 
trade off theory are examined. A critical analysis of each will be completed and 
conclusions drawn. 
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The only area relevant to the New Zealand Building Code is that of life safety and 
the protection of other peoples property. Although various methods have been used 
to analyse trade off clauses in the past the most obvious method of determining the 
life safety of the trade off clauses is by conducting a risk analysis. The risk analysis 
used will consider the possibility of failure of the sprinkler system and spread of fire 
through the structure. 
Property protection is of no interest to the Building Code, however it is of great 
interest to property owners and insurers. Even if by utilising the trade off clauses life 
safety is assured they may still place property at greater risk from fire. To 
investigate this effect a cost benefit analysis will be conducted. 
By considering all of the above aspects conclusions will be drawn on how trade off 
clauses effect property and life safety and how they should be used in the future. 
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2. Types of Protection 
To understand balancing and trading between differing levels of two distinct types of 
fire protection it is first essential to define the types of protection into two categories 
and to understand how each of these systems work. It would also be of interest to 
know how and when each of these systems fail to complete their desired function. 
2. 1. Passive Protection 
Passive protection consists of any sort of protection that does not react to the fire. 
This typically consists of one of two methods each for a specific purpose. 
To prevent the spread of smoke and flame throughout a building partitions separating 
a building into various firecells are cmmnonly used. Each firecell is separated from 
the others by a solid mass rated to resist a fire for a length of time (or F rating). This 
limits the fire to one compartment for a length of time designed to allow the 
evacuation of building occupants in danger and limit the size of the fire to allow 
effective fire fighting operations. 
To ensure the structure remams stable maJor structural elements are rated to 
withstand the effects of fire for a length of time (or S rating). This rating ensures the 
structure will not collapse and harm property adjacent to the fire. 
2. 1 . 1 . Advantages 
The main advantage of passive systems over active systems is that they are insulated 
from any effects from outside the building. By not relying on any other systems this 
form of protection is immune from problems with services such as electricity or 
water supplies. Therefore, in the event of an earthquake or other natural disaster 
they could be expected to be more reliable. 
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2. 1.2. Disadvantages 
The disadvantage of passive protection is that, by definition, it does not react to the 
fire. As passive protection is only rated for a finite length of time without further 
intervention from the fire service or any other outside influence the entire contents 
and lining of a building will be lost, although the structure is expected to remain 
stable. 
Further failings of passive systems lie in the fact that unlike active protection 
systems they are not subject to stringent testing and maintenance procedures, this 
results in the fact that over time the passive system is likely to become compromised. 
Changes to the structure, new cables or plumbing are all likely to be placed through 
fire rated walls and there is every chance they will not be sealed properly. Even the 
smallest of gaps around a wall penetration can lead to the failure of a passively rated 
wall as flame spreads to the adjacent compartment and attacks the partition from 
both sides. 
2.1.3. Potential Failures 
Passive systems are expected to withstand the effects of fire for at least their rating. 
Usually this is true but it does not take in to account the spread of smoke and flame 
around the barrier through open doors, windows or holes for services as shown in 
Figure 1 
As the fire spreads around the separation burning begins to occur on both sides of the 
partition and it will break down much faster than expected and allow the further 
spread of fire to occur at a much greater rate. 
FIRE SPREAD 
8 Y HEAT 
TRANSMISSION 
FIRE SPREAD 
THROUGH 
OPEN DOOR 
tal 
(bl 
IRE SPREAD 
BY STRUCTURAL 
FA I LURE 
Figure 1; Assumed (a) and actual (b) failures of passive systems 
2.2. Active Protection 
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Active systems by definition react to the fire and move to surpress it by the 
application of a gas or liquid. Sprinklers are by far the most common form of active 
protection. Sprinklers consist of a network of sprinkler heads on the ceiling or roof 
of a firecell each connected to the others by piping charged with pressurised water. 
If any of these heads reach a temperature above a predetermined value (usually 50-
700C) the head will operate and apply water to the area below, thereby at least 
limiting the growth of the fire. In most cases a single sprinkler head will surpress 
and eventually extinguish the fire. 
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2.2.1. Advantages 
The active system, when it is designed and maintained correctly, it is expected to 
extinguish the fire in 67%i1 of cases or restrict the fire to a small size until it is 
extinguished by other means (usually an occupant) in over 99% of cases. This 
effectiveness and reliability have combined to give sprinklers an excellent record in 
this country. Sprinklers are now acknowledged to protect both life and property 
except in extreme cases. 
The effect of water being applied to the base of the fire so early in its development is 
very beneficiaL Sprinklers will cause a mixture of cooling and oxygen depletion to 
slow combustion and pre-wetting of adjacent fuels to reduce the spread of the fire. 
In a sprinkler controlled fire the compartment temperature is not expected to rise 
above 300°c. 
2.2.2. Disadvantages 
The major disadvantage of an active system is that it relies on water provided 
(usually) from outside the system. Vandals and arsonists can tamper with this supply 
to render the system inoperable or a natural event such as an earthquake can destroy 
the piping required for this supply. In these cases a sprinkler system is rendered 
inoperable and fire protection will rely totally on passive systems. 
The type of fire can also greatly influence the sprinkler systems performance. In the 
case of an explosion followed by fire the sprinkler system may be rendered 
inoperable due to pipework being destroyed. At the other end of the scale 
smouldering fires may not produce enough heat at the sprinkler heads to operate the 
system. Fires of this type will still produce large amounts of smoke that could cause 
extensive property damage, or in extreme cases threaten life safety. 
1 The numbers in italics refer to references at the end of this document 
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As water is applied to the fire the smoke generated by the fire has its composition 
substantially altered. Large amounts of superheated steam are added to the products 
of combustion to produce a gas which carries much more heat. The steam in the 
smoke, if inhaled, will heat the throat and lungs of the victim to a much greater 
extent than smoke alone would creating a greater threat to life safetyii. Balanced 
against this effect is the fact that the amounts of smoke and heat produced by the fire 
are limited by application of water. 
The application of water from a sprinkler system will also cool the smoke produced 
by a fire making it less buoyant, this will greatly influence the way in which the 
smoke will travel through the structure. In this case systems designed to deal with 
the smoke such as extraction and venting systems may not function as designed 
leading to a greater hazard. 
2.2.3. Potential Failures 
Active systems are far more complicated than passive systems and therefore are 
likely to suffer from a lower reliability. This is offset in this country against the 
strong inspection and maintenance procedures that are required by NZS 4541. 
Failures in sprinkler systems usually occur at the point where the water supply enters 
the building. Valves may be tampered with or set in the wrong position rendering 
the system inoperable or the water supply may have been disrupted further from the 
building due to a broken water main. 
Another potential failure occurs if the contents of a sprinklered space are changed 
and the fire hazard increased without any alterations to the sprinkler system. This 
means there is potential for a fire to grow faster than the sprinkler system is designed 
to cope with and the sprinkler system may be overpowered as many heads operate 
and the pressure (and therefore the water available to each head) drops. 
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A failure that is becoming increasingly common as storage methods change is the 
shielding of the fire by storage racks. In rack sprinkler systems have been designed 
to deal with this situation but building owners are hesitant to install a system that 
will limit their flexibility in the future by fixing the racks in position. 
Also seen in storage situations is plastic wrapping of pallets or packages of goods, in 
these cases the sprinkler system is unable to pre-wet the fuel which may lead to a 
much greater spread of fire. 
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3. Sprinkler Trade Off Clauses 
Sprinkler trade off clauses appear in many forms in many building codes around the 
world. What all these clauses have in common is that they allow other fire safety 
measures to be lowered or eliminated in buildings protected with approved sprinkler 
systems. 
Most of these clauses allow lowering of fire resistance ratings, e. g. from 30/30/30 to 
15/15/15, however in some cases they allow the removal of fire resistance rating 
altogether. The other approaches which also qualify as sprinkler trade offs are those 
where the maximum allowable size of a firecell is increased, or the maximum escape 
path lengths are increased. All of these approaches make the structure cheaper (if 
sprinklers have been included already) and give the designer more flexibility in 
developing a design that will conform to the approved documents. 
In New Zealand a sprinkler system conforming to NZS 4541 or NZS 4515 can be 
utilised to allow lowered passive protection standards throughout a building. 
3.1. Trade Off Justification 
There is an argument presented that sprinkler trade offs cannot be justified. It is 
suggested by some people that because the sprinkler success rate is so high in this 
country when a sprinkler system is present in a building, no passive protection is 
required at all. A sprinkler system will confine the fire to the object of origin and 
any passive systems present will not be threatened. 
If we are to consider the possibility of sprinkler failure we must assume the sprinkler 
system fails completely. Therefore the original level of passive protection will be 
required to ensure the safety of occupants, the environment, Fire Service staff and 
other peoples property. This will be only 0.54%i of the time but on these occasions 
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the level of passive protection described in the approved documents will be required 
as the fire growth rate has not been altered. 
How do trade offs fit in to this scenario? It is a fact fire engineering is an inexact 
science, the large number of assumed variables and the unpredictable nature of fire 
make calculating the exact progress of a fire impossible. Also the consequences of 
fire are so great that all fire designs carry a factor of safety usually ranging from 1. 5 
to 3. In the rare event of a sprinkler failure it would be possible to reduce this factor, 
as the probability of this event occurring is so low. 
If the factor of safety is reduced to between 1 and 2 we can reduce the design ratings 
of passive systems by 33-50% while still retaining a safe design in the event of a 
sprinkler failure. Although this lowered passive rating is not as capable of dealing 
with factors beyond the scope of the design, if the original design is sound we must 
assume the building will still be safe. 
3.2. Determining Correct Factors of Safety 
If this method is to be used to justify trade offs the original range of safety factors 
used to develop the approved documents must be considered. 
Presently a BIA working group is considering the limits of tenability and recently 
made the comment below. 
"The working group has not yet reached agreement on where 
minimum safety factors should be set in the proposed Ver?fication 
Method, and comment is sought fi·om interested parties. The expected 
range of minimum safety factors is between 1.5 and 2.5 with the 
possibility that different occupancies will be subject to different 
values. ,iii 
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If the working group does select this range of factors of safety within its calculations 
and the standard level oftrade off remains at the present level of 50% once the trade 
offs have been applied we would expect the factors of safety to be reduced to 
between 0.75 and 1.25 and some designs may be unsafe in the rare event of a 
sprinkler failure. 
It would be hoped the areas that are traded off have the larger safety factors (between 
2 and 2.5) or be in areas not critical to life safety, otherwise life safety will be 
threatened. If the sprinkler system fails, to maintain safety in critical areas where the 
safety factor is small the logical level of trade off may be no more than a 33% 
reduction in passive protection. 
12 
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4. Literature Review 
4. 1. Trade Off Analysis 
Although the effects of trade offs are not well understood some efforts have been 
made to quantify the risks involved in trading between fire protection measures and 
determining the correct level of trade off. The most successful work of this type has 
been carried out with a statistical study completed in the U.K. by G. Ramachandran 
and risk analysis and delphi studies completed in Canada by T.Z Harmathy. 
4.1.1. Extreme Value Theory 
In the early 1980's research was being carried out in England to determine the 
correct value for trade offs. G. Ramachandraniv has used the properties of extreme 
order statistics to compare cases with and without sprinklers and with varying levels 
of passive protection. 
Method 
For events such as fires where a large amount of data is available but it is not 
economical to collect and analyse all this data extreme value theory may be used. 
For assessing the value of fire protection measures loss data is generally only freely 
available for the most significant events. For example, it was found during an 
analysis of the textile industry in England the 10% of fires that produced the highest 
loss were responsible for 50% of the total loss. Once the data from these fires are 
collected and arranged in order of descending loss a parent distribution may be 
applied. 
Once this parent distribution has been developed it is possible to predict the largest 
loss during a time period (usually a year) and the total loss over this same period. 
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These results are usually presented on a chart with number of fires against expected 
loss, an example is shown in Figure 2. 
465 
n - Fire frequency 
Upper confidence limit 
----------- Modal value 
-- Lower confidence limit 
Number of fires 
Figure 2; Results of extreme value study 
By applying this method twice, to structures protected purely passively and again to 
buildings with sprinklers and lowered passive protection it will be possible to 
compare the two results to determine which method produces the lowest dollar loss. 
If the method is conducted again replacing dollar loss with lives lost a comparison 
could be made to determine the value of these systems to life safety. 
Results 
Although it proved impossible to conduct this analysis in New Zealand due to the 
scarcity of available data, a similar analysis has been conducted on textile industry 
buildings in the U.K. 
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Ramachandran divided the buildings into four groups, sprinklered, further divided 
into high and low fire resistance, and unsprinldered also further divided into high and 
low fire resistance. By using loss data made available by the insurance community, 
presented in Table 1, he compared the dollar loss as a result of fires in these 
buildings. 
Sprinklered High fire resistance 
Low fire resistance 
Non Sprinklered High fire resistance 
Low fire resistance 
Table 1; Total fire cost for extreme value analysis 
. .... _~···.·tC't. ··v.~'-'.c•.•.•.· ••, 
Floor Area (square feet) 
------···--------------
100 000 1 000 000 
37 900 322 800 
29 600 268 600 
48 300 281 900 
56 700 624 900 
The results here that are relevant to the trade off problem is the fact that losses in 
sprinklered buildings are lower than those in non sprinklered buildings whether the 
levels of passive protection in the structure are high or low. 
Ramachandran used these results to conclude ... 
"If for some reason it is decided not to install sprinklers in a large multi-
storey building it would be more economical (less total cost) to make the 
building highly fire resistant. However, if sprinklers are to be installed, 
it is not economical to spend money to increase the fire resistance of the 
structure as well. " 
It is well known that New Zealand has a sprinkler record well above the record in the 
U.K. This is due to a number of factors including the extensive testing and 
maintenance procedures we have in place and the high water pressures we typically 
experience in this country. It could be concluded therefore that if this method were 
to be applied to a group of buildings in this country the outcome here would be even 
more favourable towards trade offs. 
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4.1.2. Risk Analysis 
In the late 80's Harmathyv conducted a set of risk and delphi studies concerning the 
balancing of fire protection measures to achieve the greatest possible protection for a 
given cost. 
This work concluded in the production of the following equation. 
Where 
L = fire loss (human + property) expectation (dollars per year per square 
metre floor area) 
N = expected number of fire incidents (per year per square metre of floor 
area) 
Pp = probability that, given ignition, the fire will not reach flashover 
PFN = probability that, given flashover, the fire will not spread to other 
compartments 
PFsD= probability that, given flashover, the fire will spread to other 
compartments by destruction. 
PFsc = probability that, given flashover, the fire will spread to other 
compartments by convection (by the advance of flames and hot gases) 
lp = average loss (human + property) resulting from fires that do not reach 
flashover (dollars per incident) 
lFN = average loss (human + property) resulting from post flashover fires 
that do not spread (dollars per incident) 
lFsD = average loss (human + property) resulting from post flashover fires 
that spread by destruction (dollars per incident) 
lpsc = average loss (human + property) resulting from post flashover fires 
that spread by convection (dollars per incident) 
Harmathy then completed this equation with data from fire losses in Canada and a 
combination of the results of a Delphi study2 and historical data to detennine the 
required probabilities. 
2 A Delphi study draws from the expertise of group experts in any field. Although these experts never 
meet and the study is completed by mail their opinions, normally on probabilities, are compared and if 
they fall within statistical bounds are accepted. If they fail to converge an iterative process is 
undertaken with the participants asked to supply a new opinion based upon the previous findings. If 
the results still fail to converge no result is obtained. 
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Information on Expected Losses 
NFIRS data was analysed to produce the data shown in Table 2. Hannathy noted 
that although there was no factual basis to the assumption that fires spread by 
destruction caused more property damage than fires spread by convection $5 000 
was added to this figure to denote the barrier being destroyed completely. 
Value for human life was taken as $0.558 x 106 and cost for injury as 0.022 x 106, 
these being the figures reported in the Reugg-Fuller study'li. Harmathy commented 
these were well accepted figures in Canada in 1985 but seem much lower than 
figures accepted in New Zealand today. 
•• • •• • •t ·-oo">Y'""'"~- "' ••·=• U .. ,.. •• • • .•• ,, """"'-"'- •t "·0~;<-~·c-~-'-"' tr • '""''~";""'"'"""-"" •· 
Types ofLoss 
Property Loss 
Death 
Injury 
Losses in fires that 
do not reach 
flashover 
Losses in fires that grow beyond flashover ($ per 
incident) 
·~~ ($~p~~.i~<*ie..n~L . . . H •• ••• •••••• • • u•• • •• H •• ........ .. •• 
692 
993 
448 
= 2173 
Non- spreading Fire spread by Fire spread by 
fires destruction convection 
5 696 43 698 38 698 
6 696 17 744 17 744 
1 384 2 248 2 248 
= 13 776 = 63 690 = 58 690 
Table 2; Expected loss from fire (per m2 floor area) 
Information on Probabilities 
Table 3 shows how Hannathy interpreted the available NFIRS data to place all of the 
available data into three categories. 
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As Interpreted by As Classified by NFIRS Data Number of Fires Total 
Harmathy 
(Given Ignition) 
No flashover 
(Given Flashover) 
No spread 
(Given Flashover) 
Spread 
Fires confined to object 
Fires confined to part of room 
75% of fires confined to room 
Fires undetermined/not reported 
25% offires confined to part of room 
Fires confined to compartment 
80% of fires confined to floor 
20% of fires contained to floor 
Confined to structure 
Extended beyond structure 
95 558 
36 297 
21 731 
61 421 
215 007 
7 243 
1 699 
6 660 
15 602 
1 665 
35 659 
5 712 
43 036 
215 007 
15 602 
43 036 
273 036 
Table 3: Interpretation of Fire Spread Data 
This data indicated 78.7% of fires would not reach flashover and would not spread 
beyond the room of origin, 5. 7% of fires would reach flashover and also would not 
spread. The final 15.6% of fires would reach flashover and spread from the room of 
origin by destruction of the separating (F rated) elements or spread around fire rated 
elements through doors or other openings. 
Harmathy then used these probabilities and expected loss values to determine 
expected losses for various building types with varying levels of protection. Two 
examples of interest to this study are reproduced in Table 4 and Table 5. 
Pp (no flashover) 
PFN (no spread) 
Expected Loss 
($/year/m2 floor area) 
Reference: conditions Buildings Fire Resistance Building Equipped 
(minimum to meet Increased (PFsD lowered with Sprinklers 
code) 
0.837 
0.402 
$0.208 
from 10% to 5%) 
0.837 
0.402 
$0.207 
1.00 
0.611 
$0.087 
Table 4; Results of Harmathy's Analysis (Office Building) 
Pr (no flashover) 
PFN (no spread) 
Expected Loss 
($/year/m2 floor area) 
Reference: conditions Buildings Fire Resistance Building Equipped 
(minimum to meet Increased (PrsD lowered with Sprinklers 
code) 
0.787 
0.350 
$0.545 
from 10% to 5%) 
0.787 
0.350 
$0.542 
1.00 
0.656 
$0.171 
Table 5; Results of Harmathy's Analysis (Apartment Building) 
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As we can see from these two tables the increase of fire resistance to contain the fire 
did not give any benefit to the building owner, the installation of sprinklers however 
did provide great benefits. It could be concluded therefore that if sprinklers were to 
be added to the base case and the passive protection lowered there would still be a 
net gain for the owner of the property. 
At the conclusion of his study Harmathy noted. 
I. With basic low-rise buildings the optimum fire safety situation can be 
achieved with sprinklers, which will prevent a fire from reaching the 
flashover stage. 
2. Case I indicates the fittility of t1ying to improve fire safety by increasing the 
fire resistance requirements. 
The first conclusion is obvious the second, however, does not seem as self evident. 
Harmathy's second conclusion was based on his finding that fire spread (in post 
flashover fires) in the majority of cases was around the passive protection system and 
therefore the rating of the system had no effect on fire spread. He concluded the 
level of this protection is only of interest when the firecells were extremely well 
designed, constructed and maintained. 
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4.2. Fire Tests 
From time to time fire tests are completed either by design or coincidence that relate 
directly to the trade off problem. A selection of the most significant are presented 
below. 
4.2.1. 140 Williams Street 
Tests were undertaken in 1990 on a representative corner portion of an existing 40-
storey building situated in Melbourne. vii 
The building in question was due to be refurbished and by law the existing asbestos 
insulation on the beams had to be removed. The tests were conducted to determine 
if the existing level of fire protection in the building (even though it did not meet the 
Building Code of Australia) was acceptable. The major deviations from the building 
code requirements were the lack of passive protection on the beams and floorslabs 
and the extra light hazard sprinkler system. 
The stated goals of the tests were: 
I. Observe the nature, duration and intensity of fires generated by 
the contents and enclosure of offices typical of those in the 
prototype building. 
2. Observe and evaluate the influence of the resulting fires on the 
unprotected composite slab and structural steelwork framing. 
3. Observe the effectiveness of the extra light hazard sprinkler 
system for fires in the small office and open plan office areas of 
the building, and 
4. Obtain data for use in the risk assessments to be conducted on the 
building. 
A fire was started in a waste paper bin in a small office opening into the open plan 
office area. At 6 minutes the windows began to break and the fire spread to the open 
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plan office area. The fire then began to subside and four more fires were lit in the 
open plan area to accelerate the fire growth. 118 minutes after ignition the fire was 
beginning to subside and the fire was extinguished at 130 minutes. 
There were no signs of distress or damage, such as permanent buckling or distortion 
to the structure of the building after the fire, and an inspection revealed no visible 
damage to the structural members. 
The maximum beam deflection of span/73 was recorded during the fire but 
approximately half of this deflection was recovered once the structure had cooled. 
The maximum recorded steel temperature was 650°C. 
4.2.2. Collins Street 
The Collins Street tests were conducted in the same enclosure used for the Williams 
Street tests. The purpose of the test was to collect steel and air temperatures under 
real fire conditions in a realistic office situation. vii 
The fire was started in a waste paper basket and allowed to bum out naturally, the 
peak air temperature was recorded as 1163°C near the ceiling. 
The main conclusions from the tests were ... 
1. External columns without passive fire protection located close to windows 
pelformed satisfactorily. 
2. Columns without passive protection located within the enclosure required 
only nominal fire protection (provided by thin steel sheeting) to keep their 
temperatures below 500°C. 
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4.2.3. 1990 Broadgate Fire 
In 1990 a fire occurred on the first floor (second storey) of a 14 floor office building 
under construction in London.viii The fire started in a sub contractors office on a 
floor where most beams and no columns carried any passive protection. Quickly this 
fire grew to a fully developed ventilation limited fire. 
Maximum temperatures during the fire were estimated as 540°C at the bolts and 
650°C in the steelwork. 
The damage to the structure during the fire was 
1. distortion of some floor trusses 
2. distortion of some universal beams near the supports 
3. local buckling and shortening of five of the lighter columns by up to 1 OOmm 
Despite all this damage the structure remained stable and the damage was repaired 
quickly. 
4.2.4. Report of Thomas et al 
Thomas et al. presented a summary of 42 fires in multi-storey buildings, of these 18 
were in steel framed buildings viii. All of these buildings contained some level of 
passive protection on steel structural members. 
All of the fires detailed involved fully developed fires, the conclusions were ... 
1. In the majority of cases, no post fire distortion of the structural fi·ame was 
recorded nor was distortion noted during the fire. 
2. In one case large quantities of passive protection was removed from the 
beams before the fire. Smaller secondary beams suffered some permanent 
deflection and local buckling, shear failure of some bolts was also noted 
Despite this there was no local or regional loss of structural integrity. 
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3. In afire in New York in 1993 a similar pattern was noted where secondary 
beams failed and local instability resulted, no loss of jloorslab integrity or 
overall stability was.fmmd. 
4. In two other cases minor buckling and in one case connection failure was 
noted, in none of these cases did instability result. 
4.2.5. Conclusions 
In all of these situations the required standard of passive protection on structural 
members were compromised either by accident or design. However, none of these 
cases required any major work on the structure. 
This would indicate the requirements for passive protection on structural elements 
might be placed at a conservative level to protect structures from very large fires. If 
the safety factors were to be lowered the structure would still be safe although it 
would be less well prepared for unpredicted large fires. 
The standards used in New Zealand to protect structural elements place the required 
ratings at approximately the same level as these cases overseas, therefore we could 
assume we have the same safety levels built into our structures. 
One item of interest is that all of the detailed reports of fires were in steel framed 
buildings. It is assumed the behaviour of other types of buildings would be different 
and it would be prudent for a reasonable factor of safety to remain in place for non-
steel framed buildings until more data is collected on their behaviour in fire. 
4.3. Report of Buettner 
While all this work points to the fact trade offs improve life safety and property 
protection there are other opinions. In 1980 Buettnerix published a paper indicating 
sprinkler trade offs should be applied with caution for the following reasons ... 
24 
• Sprinkler proponents claim that many fire deaths could have been prevented 
if sprinklers had existed However many other systems, such as smoke 
detectors, might have been equally or more effective as they operate earlier. 
• In earthquake zones, statistics show that when structures peJform well 
sprinkler systems remain intact. Unfortunately earthquakes often destroy the 
water mains that supply the ~prinkler systems. Again sprinklers without 
water are just a collection of useless pipes. 
• Arson is the fastest growing crime in the United States. Arsonists, spwTed by 
motives of revenge, vandalism, and insurance fi·aud, will prevent ~prinklers 
from working. 
• Many building fires are accompanied by or as result from explosions that 
break waterlines, rendering sprinkler systems inoperative. 
Mainly due to the high rate of sprinkler failure in America (which he reported as 
43%) he concluded ... 
• Building structures should be highly resistive to fire and should be designed 
to minimise the possibility of structural failure during a fire. This is essential 
not only for occupants but also for fire-fighters. 
• Compartmentation is a proven method of providing life safety for building 
occupants. Compartmentation (in other than small buildings) should include 
enclosing each storey, stairwell, elevator and utility shafts, and should 
provide at least two compartments separated by self closing doors or 
dampers. 
• Automatic sprinkler systems must be required in hazardous areas, 
particularly where combustible contents exist. However, the structural 
integrity or life safety aspects must not be impaired Sprinklers are simply 
not effective enough to justifY using them alone in a life safety system. If 
~prinklers fail to control a fire, the building is no better off than if the 
sprinklers were not present. All it takes for failure is one closed valve. 
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It should be noted that the success rate of sprinklers in this country is much higher 
than those quoted by Buettner for America. Therefore the applicability of this study 
to New Zealand's conditions may be questioned. 
Despite these drawbacks the report does draw attention to various important facts 
such as the potential for sprinkler failure and the dangers of natural disaster that must 
be investigated further. 
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5. Building Code Trade Off Clauses 
5. 1. History/Origin of Clauses 
5.1.1. NZS 1900 Chapter 5 
Prior to the introduction of the New Zealand Building Code, Chapter 5 of the New 
Zealand Standard NZS 1900x regulated fire safety in New Zealand. NZS 1900 
Chapter 5 was originally a model bylaw but it was made mandatory in the early 
1970's and progressively updated until replaced by the New Zealand Building Code 
in 1992. 
Sprinkler trade offs were first introduced into NZS 1900 in July 1978 when 
"additional credits for automatic sprinkler systems" were first allowed. These 
clauses were described in the foreword to later additions by ... 
"1. Major changes were introduced by Amendment 12 (1978), especially 
with the insertion of Table JA, which permitted lowering of "types of 
construction" required where sprinkler protection is provided, thus 
enabling more extensive use of timber structural elements ... " 
These trade offs are listed in the Appendix 1. 
As stated in the foreword the major addition to the standard was an additional table 
supplementing Table 1 "Maximum allowable areas, number of storeys and minimum 
types of construction". Table lA "Fire Compartments with Sprinklers" allowed, 
depending on fire risk group, either lowered fire resistance ratings on partitions or 
increased maximum firecell area. 
By the time it was replaced NZS 1900 carried trade offs in the following areasxi ... 
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o Increased compartment area 
o Larger window openings (with drenchers) 
• Reduced fire resistance ratings of exterior walls 
• Saving in design of portal frames (not required to stand alone) 
o Larger fire door openings 
o Increased building height 
o Combined exitways 
5.1.2. New Zealand Building Code 
The New Zealand Building Codexii was introduced in early 1992 and replaced the 
fire safety provisions in NZS 1900 Chapter 5. 
As early as 1970's it was proposed to replace NZS 1900 but various problems with 
the development of the new standard (DZ 4226) meant by the mid 1980's little 
progress had been made. In an effort to speed up progress a new group was formed 
that eventually produced the Building Code that is now in place. 
Early in the development of the Building Code a decision was taken to leave the 
protection of property to the owner of that property and only safeguard life (of both 
the occupants and the Fire Service), the environment and other persons property. 
This decision enabled the new documents to be written in a form that was much 
easier to use and enforce. 
The negative effect of this was that by not enforcing property protection the 
economic situation of the country could suffer. Property lost in a fire is entered as a 
debit against New Zealand's GDP (Gross Domestic Produce). This means if New 
Zealand were to suffer a large property loss from fire in one year this would be 
equivalent to a lowering of the international wool or meat prices. Therefore property 
3 A countries GDP is a measure of its overall economic wellbeing and is widely used to "rank" the 
status of countries 
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protection from fire could be seen in the same light as energy conservation or 
manufacturing efficiency - benefits are not only gained by the immediate benefactor 
(the property owner in this case) by the country as a whole. However, it was decided 
the incentive of reducing the immediate loss to a building owner from fire would be 
enough to ensure the building owner would ensure property losses from fire 
remained at a satisfactory level. 
Eight trade off clauses were present at the introduction of the new Building Code. 
Four of these clauses allowed areas of passive protection to be lowered where 
sprinklers where present and the remaining four allowing the total removal of some 
passive protection. Although it is unclear exactly how the clauses where developed 
and justified it is assumed they where largely influenced by the provisions in DZ 
4226 and overseas building codes which made extensive use of trade off clauses at 
the time. 
5.2. Clauses in Question 
The clauses presently in the Approved Documents are shown in Appendix 1 these 
clauses when applied with the allowances in the B tables constitute the trade offs 
presently in allowed in the approved documents. Generally these clauses allow a 
50% discount in passive systems, however two clauses allow for the total removal of 
some passive systems. 
5.3. Effect of Clauses 
Often building owners will opt to include a sprinkler system in the design of a new 
building where they are not otherwise required by the approved documents, they will 
be added to increase property protection and to lower insurance premiums for the 
building. When sprinklers are included in a building, the safety of occupants of that 
building and the safety of adjacent properties is greatly improved. 
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To offset this increased level of protection in the building the safety factors in other 
areas may be reduced. This may lead to lowered firecell ratings, minimum firecell 
sizes, and lowering of other passive restrictions. 
In most cases when sprinklers fail we know they usually fail completely and at best 
restrict the fire growth for a limited time. In situations such as these it could be 
argued the original levels of passive safety will be required to ensure life safety. 
However in the development of the approved documents it was determined that if the 
sprinkler system should fail the lowered levels of passive protection will still provide 
a minimum level of life safety. 
Two cases allow the total removal of passive systems; Clause 3.7.3 allows a firecell 
area in a single storey building to be unlimited and Clause 5.5.3 allows the removal 
of smokecells around shafts (except in purpose groups SC and SD). If clauses such 
as these allow the total removal of passive systems one of two situations must be 
occurring, either the passive system was not required in the first place and if the 
sprinkler system fails the structure will still meet all its design requirements, or the 
passive system was required and the structure has been made unsafe with their 
removal. 
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6. F Ratings 
F Ratings are applied to partitions within a building designed to prevent the spread of 
fire and smoke, the effect of these partitions is to divide the building into separate 
firecells each insulated from the effects of fire in the next cell by a certain time. 
F ratings apply to ... 
"Primmy and secondmy elements within a firecell, including walls 
and floors which are fire separations, together with their 
supporting elements within the same firecell. " 
6. 1. Building Code Requirements 
F ratings are required in acceptable solutions to ensure the safety of occupants. The 
Building Code requires a building be constructed to ... 
1. Give people adequate time to reach a safe place without being overcome by 
the effects of fire 
2. Give Fire Service personnel adequate time to undertake rescue operations 
6.2. How the Approved Documents Meet these Criteria 
To meet these requirements the approved documents require a building to be divided 
into firecells of various sizes and with various fire resistance ratings. The effect of 
this is to limit the speed with which a fire can spread through a structure providing 
extra time during which occupants and fire-fighters can safely move within the 
structure away from the firecells already affected by fire. 
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6.3. How Sprinkler Trade Offs Affect these Criteria 
Where a sprinkler system is installed by the building owner (and not required by any 
other section of the approved documents) the F ratings required by the approved 
documents is lowered in some areas. The building owner has probably installed 
sprinklers to safeguard his property but their installation has also greatly increased 
the safe margin for life safety within the building. Therefore, it is reasoned the 
safety factors on any other protection features may be lowered. 
It is known F ratings carry a safety factor of 1.5 to 2.5, if these ratings were to be 
reduced by 50% (as is most commonly seen in trade off clauses) we could expect the 
new safety factors to range from 0.75 to 1.25. We could now suggest that some of 
these clauses do not provide a satisfactory level of life safety. 
We would hope that the areas that allow trade offs are the areas that the larger safety 
factors apply to and the design is still expected to be safe. However even in this case 
the safety factor is reduced to what could be considered to be a minimum level, any 
further reductions in required F ratings would have to be questioned. 
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7. S Ratings 
S ratings are applied to buildings that can cause harm to other property in the event 
of a fire. The S rating ensures the building will remain stable and not threaten other 
structures on adjacent properties. 
S ratings apply to ... 
a) "Fh·e separations within firecells which require subdivision 
due to restrictions in floor area" 
b) "Primary elements within a firecell which provide stability to 
an external wall not permitted to have I 00% unprotected area" 
c) "Secondmy elements forming parts of an external wall which 
are not permitted to be unprotected areas" 
d) "Any part of the floor system and structural frame designed to 
provide stability to the external wall when required by 
Paragraph 4.3." 
e) "Fire separations, floors and supporting structures in car 
parking spaces within a building as required by Paragraphs 
2.12.3 to 2.12.5" 
7.1. Building Code Requirements 
The Building Code requires a structure to 
1. Protect household units and other property from damage due to structural 
instability caused by fire. 
2. Safeguard the environment from adverse effects caused by fire. 
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7.2. How the Approved Documents Meet these Criteria 
To meet these requirements the approved documents ensure a building is structurally 
stable during· a fire by specifying minimum fire ratings (or S ratings) for those 
structural elements deemed to be vital to the buildings design. 
7.3. How Sprinkler Trade Offs Affect these Criteria 
When sprinklers are added to a building the safety margin provided by the approved 
documents for structural stability is considerably increased due to the lowered 
temperatures and lowered expected size and duration of the fire. Thus it has been 
deemed acceptable to lower the factors of safety of the approved documents in these 
cases. 
The fire tests already considered in this report indicate the required S factors have a 
large factor of safety and even when this rating is reduced by the removal of some 
passive protection the structure performs as required. 
The reduction presently allowed in the approved documents is 50%, this reduction 
means that passive protection is commonly required on structural member to meet 
this stipulation although this protection is lighter and cheaper. If the allowances 
were to be reduced further the structural member itself could meet the S rating and 
no passive protection would be required. 
The consequences of a structure failing due to fire would be large. The businesses 
within the building would be disrupted for a long time, other property would be 
damaged and the probability the fire would spread to an adjacent building would be 
greatly increased. Other factors such as the international attention this event would 
bring and the harm it could do to New Zealand's standing at the forefront of the fire 
safety community would be very hard to deal with. 
35 
For these reasons any further lowering of the S ratings allowed under the approved 
documents must be bought in to question and carefully investigated before changes 
are made. 
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8. Firecell Areas 
8. 1. Building Code Requirements 
Area restrictions are required in the approved documents where S ratings are 
required for a structure. Although there is no clear objective within the Building Act 
or Building Code in limiting the firecell areas doing so will achieve several stated 
goals ... 
1. Protection of Fire Service personnel (by limiting the size of the fire) 
2. Protection of the enviromnent (by limiting the size of the fire and therefore 
the emission of toxic products) 
3. Control the spread of fire (as required by the Building Act) 
8.2. How the Approved Documents Meet these Criteria 
The approved documents limit the firecell area in Clause 3.7. Firecells in buildings 
requiring S ratings are limited in size to limit the amount of fuel available to the fire 
and therefore the expected fire size. 
8.3. How Sprinkler Trade Offs Affect these Criteria 
When sprinklers are provided by the building owner in a single storey building 
Clause 3.7.3 allows unlimited firecell area. This allowance may result in a large 
amount of fuel being available to the fire. 
Large single storey buildings are generally used as warehouses and it is in this type 
of occupancy that large property losses are most often experienced. An analysis of 
fire statistics has shown warehouse structures have 15% of fires in New Zealand but 
suffer 50% of the total losses. The mass of goods packed in high density, often in 
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rack storage, provides a large fuel load to the fire and the lack of effective fire 
protection measures makes fire a real concern. 
It is this type of building where sprinklers most often fail to achieve their objectives. 
Often sprinkler heads are high above the floor leading to delayed operation. Also if 
the goods are shrink wrapped in plastic the sprinkler system will be tmable to wet 
down fuel adjacent to the fire and fire spread will be more rapid, even to the point 
where the sprinkler system may be overpowered. Another potential problem in this 
type of building is the high rack storage which may mean there are locations within 
the racks out of reach of the sprinkler system. 
Despite all of these problems life safety is of no real concern in these types of 
buildings due to the ease of escape from such a building. In a typical open plan 
single storey warehouse there are many escapes around the building and no real 
obstacles from anywhere within the warehouse to these exits. Property protection, 
protection of Fire Service staff and protection of the environment, however are of 
real concern. 
Despite all the problems with this type of structure sprinkler trade offs allow an 
unlimited floorspace where sprinklers are present. In the event of a sprinkler failure 
the large mass of available fuel would create a fire that would quickly grow and 
spread out of control through the building. By the time the Fire Service could 
respond to an alarm and set up to tackle the fire it would be difficult for them to fight 
the fire effectively and safely. 
Usually the best result that could be achieved would be wetting down and protecting 
adjacent properties, in this situation the building and its entire contents would be a 
complete loss. 
If trade offs had not been utilised firecell areas within the building would be limited 
to firecells of an area determined by the fuel type. Property losses would be limited 
as the rated partitions would constrain the fire to a size the Fire Service would be 
more able to control. Emissions to the environment would be limited and the fire 
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would be less likely to spread to other properties. By partitioning the structure the 
building would comply better with the Building Act and the property of the owner 
would be protected from fire and smoke damage. 
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9. Escape Path Lengths 
Escape path lengths are limited to ensure the occupants of a building can find an exit 
easily and quickly make their way to safety. 
9.1. Building Code Requirements 
The Building Code requires ... 
1. Give people adequate time to reach a safe place without being overcome by 
the effects of fire. 
2. Give Fire Service personnel adequate time to undertake rescue operations. 
9.2. How the Approved Documents Meet these Criteria 
By limiting escape path lengths the approved documents ensure occupants within the 
structure are near a place of safety and can easily reach it and fire service staff can 
easily reach the seat of the fire. 
9.3. How Sprinkler Trade Ofls Affect these Criteria 
Where a sprinkler system is installed escape path lengths may be increased by 50%, 
this will lead to a 50% increase in the time an occupant is exposed to the hannful 
effects of fire. Another effect is an increased time Fire Service staff will take to 
reach the seat of the fire, often travelling through smoke using. breathing apparatus 
which has a limited air supply. In this situation the time a fire fighter has to actually 
fight the fire is reduced (as his/her travelling time increases) resulting in a higher 
probability of the fire spreading. 
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10. Overseas Codes 
10. 1. Overseas Building Code Equivalents 
As part of the analysis of the sprinkler trade off clauses in the New Zealand Building 
Code it will be useful to compare these to the trade off clauses present in building 
codes from other countries. 
A copy of the clauses used is presented in Appendix 1 
1 0.1.1.F Ratings 
F rating reductions in overseas codes are difficult to judge as the systems used by 
different countries used to separate firecells is so diverse. Reductions are offered in 
the United States and Canada. 
1 b.1.2.S Ratings 
New Zealdh<i 
50% reduction in requirements 
Australia 
No concessions 
Canada 
Structural members in top floor and roof can be constructed of heavy timber 
Uniform Building Code 
Type II, III and IV Buildings may have the 1 hour construction limit waived. 
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1 0. 1 . 3. Escape Path Lengths 
New Zealand 
50% increase in open path lengths 
Australia 
No Concessions 
Canada 
Single egress paths from each room or suite may be increased to 25 m (up to 100% 
increase depending on hazard group) 
Uniform Building Code 
Pedestrian walkways may be up to 400 feet (33% increase) 
10.1.4.Fire Compartment Size 
New Zealand 
Unlimited firecell area in single storey buildings 
Australia 
Firecell sizes (from Table C.2) may be exceeded up to a limit of 18 000 m2 or 108 
000 m3 providing a sprinkler system and vehicle access meet acceptable 
standards. (125- 500% increase depending on hazard group) 
Canada 
Area limits on baled combustible fibres may be doubled. 
Maximum areas for rooms or suites (not in permanent dwellings) increased from 33-
50% depending on Hazard Group. 
Uniform Building Code 
Firecell areas in single storey buildings may be tripled and in upper levels may be 
doubled. 
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10.2. Conclusions 
From the brief outlines of overseas codes presented above it can be seen ,that in 
general New Zealand is generous in allowing trade offs. 
In New Zealand we allow much greater concessiOns in the areas of structural 
stability and firecell sizes. Canada does allow a greater concession on path lengths 
but this only applies to few hazard groups. 
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11. Risk Analysis 
11.1. Introduction 
Trade off theory depends heavily on the effectiveness and reliability of the system. 
The system as it is referred to in this following analysis consists of any combination 
of passive and active sub-systems combined to protect a structure and its contents 
(including any occupants) from fire. Risk analysis can be applied to any system 
where each individual component contributes in some form to the probability that 
the system will perform its required functionxiii. An accepted drawback of risk 
assessment is that it usually depends on the views and experiences of the person 
perfonning the analysis. To avoid this problem use has been made of as many 
sources as possible to try to reach a consensus opinion on the probability of each 
failure. 
Reliability is defined as "the probability of peJforming a specific function or 
mission"xiv. As sprinkler systems are all built to the same standard their reliability 
can be accurately predicted from historical data. The reliability of passive systems, 
however, is more difficult to predict due to the factors already outlined. 
Other events will heavily influence the systems effectiveness, the response of the fire 
service and the occupants of the building can heavily dictate whether a building is 
safe or not, as shown in Figure 3 
Figure 3; Factors in Reliability 
Predictable occupant 
response 
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As it is difficult to predict how these factors will influence the loss of life and 
property in a fire a method has to be developed for dealing with them. 
Fire Service response can be utilised only where sprinklers are present as we can 
assume activation of the sprinkler system will automatically operate an alarm. When 
a sprinkler is not present we can not assume an alarm will be raised and therefore we 
will exclude the Fire Service from the resulting events. 
Fire growth is more difficult to justify, different types of fire (smouldering, flaming 
explosions etc.) can lead to different responses and different failure modes in the 
systems under inspection. To account for this the analysis will be conducted 
considering a smouldering and flaming fire, other fires such as explosions should be 
dealt with separately wherever dangerous goods or other factors indicate this could 
be a problem. 
11.2. Method 
A risk assessment approach based on fault tree diagrams has been used in this study, 
this method consists of identifying the events that will lead to a failure in the system 
and then assigning probabilities to these events. 
Probabilities on the reliability of sprinkler systems has been established from the 
history of sprinkler operation in New Zealand and Australiai. Information on the 
failures of passive systems has been sourced from various studies as indicated. 
Generally these figures are an average from different locations where these sources 
closely agree, otherwise attempts have been made to discover why the values differ 
and appropriate values selected. 
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11.3. Fault Tree Development 
Two fault trees will be produced, considering cases with and without the trade off 
clauses being utilised. 
11.3.1. Probabilities of Sprinkler System Effectiveness 
Sprinkler system effectiveness and reliability can be easily determined from historic 
data widely available. Since the first sprinkler system was installed in New Zealand 
in 1889 reports have been required in every case of sprinkler activation. This has 
resulted in a large and accurate database, Maryatti has interpreted this data producing 
the summary shown in Table 6 
Probability 
Sprinkler Failure 0.03% 
Sprinkler Operation Sprink:ers Fail to Control 0.54% 
Occupant Intervenes 16.15% 
Fire Service Intervenes 20.62% 
Sprinklers Extinguish 62.66% 
Table 6; Sprinkler Operation Probabilities 
These figures indicate that in the future (if the sprinkler standard NZS 4541 remains 
largely unchanged), we could expect that in 99.43% of cases the fire would be 
confined to the object of origin. In the remainder of cases there is no information on 
how quickly the fire grew despite the application of water from the sprinkler system, 
therefore we must assume the fire grew as if no sprinkler system was present at all. 
11.3.2.Probabilities of Passive System Effectiveness 
The reliability of passive systems is more difficult to detennine due to the lack of 
reporting of the mode of spread through buildings. Various Delphi studies have been 
50 
completed around the world to try to determine how fires spread and how passive 
systems react when in place. 
A survey done in central Wellington in the late eightiesxv found that over 24% of fire 
stop doors in office blocks were either removed or wedged open. This means the 
integrity of the firecell has been destroyed, effectively the firecell rating has become 
0 minutes. Of the remaining 76% of fires we can not tell if the fires were 
extinguished immediately, contained by the passive system or spread past the passive 
system either by destruction of it or through other openings. 
These figures agree with the findings of Harmathyv who conducted a Delphi study 
and found 74.6% of fires did not reach flashover, they either did not spread from the 
object of origin or were extinguished by sprinklers or occupants. Of the fires that did 
reach flashover Hanna thy predicted between 5 and 10% of fires would spread 
through the fire barrier by destruction 
Narayanan et al published the data provided by the FIRS database (maintained by the 
New Zealand Fire Service). By using the same method as Harmathy it is then 
possible to reduce the flame spread data to the data shown below. 
Bukowski is presently producing a report for the WPixvi part of which was aDelphi 
study which concluded 74.5% of fires do not spread from the room of origin. 
No Flashover 
Narayanan et al. (1996) 
Fire Service (late 80's) 
Harmathy (1989) 
Bukowski (1982) 
80.54 
74.63 
Table 7; Performance of Passive Systems 
74.5 
Flashover 
No Spread Spread by 
Convection 
Spread by 
Destruction 
7 12.44 
24 
25.28 0.09 
25.5 
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The one variable not presented in these results is what size the fire reaches before it 
becomes part of the reporting process. It may be for this reason the figures for fire 
spread presented by Narayanan are low compared to the other studies, fires of a 
small size may have been included in the New Zealand data to produce results 
skewed towards non flashover and non-fire spread. 
To attempt to simulate the trade off clauses being utilised passive system 
effectiveness changes from situation to situation. For example where there are no 
sprinklers present the rating of the element will be double what it is when sprinklers 
are present, therefore we would expect less failures through the system. It is for this 
reason spread through the system is lowered to 5% in the passive systems example. 
11.4. Results 
If all of these probabilities are considered and all of the possible failures of the 
system determined the flow charts in Figure 4 and Figure 5 will be produced. 
Figure 4 shows all the possible outcomes and their final probabilities (shown in 
brackets) for a system utilising the trade off clauses. 
52 
Ignition 
----- ------
Sprinklers fail Sprinklers Operate Fire too small to 
operate sprinklers 
0.03% 39.37% 60.60% 
-
I I 
Confined to room Spread through Spread around Confined to room Spread around 
separation separation separation 
31.17% 5.00% 63.83% 75.50% 24.50% 
(0.009%) (0.0015%) (0.019%) (45.75%) (14.85%) 
-Sprinklers fuil to Occupant Intervenes Fire Service Sprinklers 
control Intervenes Extinguish 
0.54% 16.15% 20.63% 62.67% 
(6.36%) (8.12%) (24.67%) 
I 
Confined to room Spread through Spread around 
separation separation 
65.50% 24.50% 10.00% 
(0.139%) (0.052%) (0.021%) 
Figure 4; Risk analysis results - trade offs used 
Of interest to this problem is the high number of fires that spread through openings 
or are confined to the room. Under 1% of fires spread through a passively rated 
structure indicating efforts made to seal doors and other openings against fire are not 
sufficient. 
Figure 5 shows similar information for the case where sprinklers are not installed. 
Ignition 
~ 
-----
Flashover Non Flashover 
39.40% 60.60% 
~ I I 
Confined to room Spread through Spread around Confined to room 
separation separation 
31.17% 5.00% 63.83% 100% 
(12.28%) (1.97%) (25.15%) (60.60%) 
Figure 5; Risk analysis results - passive protection only 
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Once again the amount of fire spread around the passive system is disproportionately 
large. 
If the possible outcomes that could be a threat to life safety are examined and 
compared between the two scenarios it should be possible to determine which is 
safer. 
Where sprinklers are present the only unsafe situation will occur when sprinklers fail 
to operate or fail to control a fire and then the fire spreads around a passive system 
(which would be expected to be much quicker). Where no sprinkler system is 
present the life safety limit can be assumed to be once again in situations where the 
fire spreads by convection. 
Therefore where there is no sprinkler system present an unsafe situation might arise 
25.5% of the time and when a sprinkler system is present this figure is reduced to 
0.04%. Obviously the building that has utilised the trade off clauses is much safer 
for the occupants and presumably for the fire service as well. 
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12. Risk of Natural Disaster 
It is known sprinkler systems are most susceptible to problems in the water supply or 
at the point where the water supply enters the building. In the event of a natural 
disaster (the most obvious in New Zealand being an earthquake) this water supply 
pressure may be lowered or cut off completely, in this case extra demands will be 
placed on the already lowered level of passive protection. Again, the question arises 
"does this lowered level of protection provide a minimum level of life safety?" 
A further complication to this argument is that passive systems within the structure 
may be damaged by the same forces that threaten the water supply. This effect was 
noted in the recent Kobe and Northridge earthquakes. Now it may be argued an 
increased factor of safety may be required within the structure to offset any damage 
to these systems. Another factor is the lack of assistance that could be provided by 
the Fire Service in these situations, roads will be blocked and there will be many 
alarms to answer. Even if the Fire Service can respond to the alann the response 
time will be greatly reduced and the fire size upon arrival will be much larger. Can 
it be justified in reducing the factors of safety in passive systems under these 
circumstances? 
The chances of an earthquake large enough to threaten the buildings limit state (i.e. 
an event that will necessitate extensive inspection and reinstatement of non-
structural and structural systems) is considered to be 10% in 50 years:-.·vii. In an 
earthquake of this magnitude we could assume there would be a major disruption to 
services causing the failure of the active systems. In an earthquake of this magnitude 
it is also likely there would be some level of damage to the F rated elements within 
the structure. 
The potential level of damage to the F rated elements is difficult to determine due to 
the unpredictable nature of natural events, however it should be noted that it is in 
events such as these that the factor of safety applied to passive systems come in to 
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play and ensure life safety. If these factors of safety are lowered is life safety still 
assured in a situation such as this? 
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13. Property Protection 
In the analysis of the trade off clauses allowed within the present approved 
documents we have established how sprinkler trade offs affect life safety within a 
structure but what effect does lowered passive protection have on property 
protection? 
13. 1. Water Damage 
One of the most common charges laid against sprinkler systems is that the water 
damage to the contents of a space may be very expensive. 
It is generally accepted that sprinkler systems apply 10% of water that would be 
applied by the Fire Service in dealing with a similar fire. This is due to the fact that 
sprinklers operate much quicker than the Fire Service can respond to an alarm and 
apply water directly to the base of the fire. This means the fire is extinguished while 
it is still small and less water is required. To apply water to the fire The Fire Service 
must usually use hose streams from outside the building. It is estimated only 50%~-viii 
of the water used by the Fire Service reaches the vicinity of the fire, the rest fails to 
enter the building through openings or is blown away by wind or thermal currents. 
Therefore in the event of a fire sprinkler systems will produce much less water 
damage than the Fire Service would in dealing with the same fire. 
We must also consider the fact that sprinklers do cause damage by leakage and false 
alarms if there is no fire. In the period from 1948 to 1967 in Australia and New 
Zealand insurance claims for this type of damage averaged $70,000i per annum. 
Over the same period sprinklers were estimated to have saved $9,414,500 per annum 
in property damage indicating the damage caused by false activations is more than 
offset by the savings made in the event of a fire. 
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13.2. Smoke Damage 
Smoke damage is one of the biggest costs in small to medium sized fires. Smoke 
damage can be limited by either limiting the travel of the smoke or by quickly 
limiting the size or extinguishing the fire to limit the amount of smoke produced. 
Passive protection will achieve the first goal and active protection will achieve the 
second. 
13.2.1.Fiaming Fires 
It is expected a sprinkler head directly above a fire in a 3m ceiling space will activate 
between 5 and I 0 minutesxL'{ after ignition when the fire size would be expected to be 
10-15kW. Quick response heads can limit this activation to 2 to 5 minutes where the 
fire would be expected to be 5-lOkW. The response of the fire to the application of 
water is difficult to predict. We know that in 99.47% of cases the fire will not grow 
any further than the size at which the sprinklers activated and in a large majority of 
cases will begin to reduce in size and eventually be extinguished. 
The time to extinguishment varies widely depending on fuel, ventilation and many 
other factors. Models have been produced from tests completed on crib fires that 
indicate sprinklers can reliably halve the size of a fire in 45 seconds with a flow rate 
of 0.205mm/sxx. These fires are optimum cases with the sprinkler head directly 
above the fire and no obstructions as would be the case if the fire were under a desk. 
It can be seen that it will be many minutes before the fire is extinguished if at all. 
During this time the fire is producing smoke that will travel through the structure as 
far as the passive systems will allow. 
Although passive systems will not slow the generation of this smoke the travel of this 
smoke can be contained to a specific space and no losses will be experienced in 
firecells remote from the firecell of origin. 
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This is of interest when we consider clauses within the approved documents that 
allow the removal of smoke barriers. Clause 3.7.3 allows a firecell area in a single 
storey building to be unlimited and Clause 5.5.3 allows the removal of smokecells 
around shafts (except in purpose groups SC and SD). 
Both of these clauses will allow much greater travel to the smoke produced by a fire, 
even though a much smaller quantity of smoke will be produced. This could lead to 
a much greater loss of property when the trade off clauses have been utilised and 
firecell areas have been increased. 
13.2.2.Smouldering Fires 
A special case, which may lead to situations that are hazardous to both life and 
health, is the smouldering fire. The most commonly recognised example of 
smouldering combustion is that of a cigarette, an accurate definition of this type of 
combustion is ... 
" ... a slow low temperature jlamelessform of combustion, sustained by 
the heat evolved when oxygen directly attacks the swface of a 
condensed phase fuel ... xxi 
Smouldering fires produce a different combination of products than a full flaming 
fire, depending on the fuel, products of smouldering fires are generally more toxic 
than those of flaming fires. 
Another problem with smouldering fires is that they burn at a lower temperature 
producing a less well defined plume. The effect of this on sprinkler systems is that a 
smouldering fire is less likely to activate a sprinkler system as quickly as a flaming 
fire (if at all) due to the lowered temperatures. This would lead to a smouldering fire 
growing out of control producing large amounts of very toxic smoke that will spread 
through the structure. 
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Smoke damage in a space (to the contents and linings of that space) is limited by the 
size of this space. Obviously if a large open warehouse is divided into four sections 
by smoke curtains the damage due to smoke in the event of a small fire is likely to be 
one fourth of what it could be if the space is well designed and maintained. 
13.3. Conclusions 
In areas where valuable goods are stored (museums for example) or large quantities 
of goods are present (such as a warehouse) it would be prudent for a building owner 
not to take advantage of the trade offs presently allowed in the approved documents. 
By restricting the travel of smoke property savings may be large in the event of a fire. 
This is of course at the discretion of the owner of the property but to make this 
decision they must be properly informed. Fire engineers should bear this in mind 
when briefing building owners on the risk of fire in his/her property. 
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14. Economic Analysis 
14.1. Introduction 
The application of trade off clauses in a structure will lead to differing costs on the 
project. The cost of introducing a sprinkler system must be weighed against the 
reduced cost of passive protection and many other factors such as reduced insurance 
premmms. Benefits will also apply to the system which best protects life and 
property. 
By the use of a simple cost benefit analysis it will be possible to determine if the use 
of the sprinkler trade off clauses will be prohibitively expensive for a designer. 
14.2. Cost Benefit Method 
If a cost benefit analysis of the application of sprinkler trade off clauses is to be 
useful it must examine all the factors involved in the cost and benefit streams of 
sprinkler and passive system installations. 
The analysis will be conducted by considering a building not applying the trade off 
measures as a base case and considering the costs and benefits of applying the trade 
off clauses to the building. 
14.2.1.Cases Examined 
Two cases are to be examined in this analysis, an office building of seven floors and 
a large open warehouse. 
These cases were chosen to display trade offs being displayed in different ways, the 
main advantage in the warehouse will be the concession in firecell areas that will 
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mean no internal divisions are required. The main advantage in the office building 
will be the reduction in F rating requirements on internal divisions and S ratings on 
structural elements. 
14.2.2.Parameters 
Two general parameters are required before a cost benefit analysis can be completed. 
The time period used for this analysis was chosen as 30 years. This value was 
selected to indicate the expected lifespan of a sprinkler system. The lifespan of a 
building will probably be greater than this but events such as a change of use or 
restyling mean over a period this long the building will probably be significantly 
altered resulting in the analysis no longer being applicable. 
The discount rate is used to allow for inflation when considering on going costs such 
as maintenance and also for comparing costs in the future at different times. Cost 
Benefit studies applied to sprinklers generally use a value of 6%, therefore to allow ' 
comparison this value will be carried into this study. 
14.3. Costs and Benefit Streams 
14.3.1.Costs 
The costs used in this analysis are obvious, there is the initial cost of installing the 
chosen protection system and the on going cost of inspection and maintenance of the 
system to assure proper operation.= 
The costs of sprinkler and passive system installation are a one off cost that will be 
sourced from quantity surveyors. The cost of maintenance applies only to sprinkler 
systems where inspection and certification is required, this cost will be calculated 
using Uniform Present Worth as shown below. 
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Where ... 
Ao =recurring annual sum to be paid over a period ofN years($) 
1 = discount rate 
n = expected lifetime of the system (years) 
UPW =uniform present worth($) 
14.3.2.Benefits 
Benefits are provided by the reduced losses in life, injury and property when the 
system acts as expected. Another benefit can be applied where a sprinkler system is 
installed, that of reduced insurance premiums. A benefit unique to trade offs is that 
ofthe lowered cost of passive systems. 
Values for costs due to loss oflife and injuries is the product of the probability of the 
event by the cost of the event. The value of human life and injuries is an emotive 
issue, most recent studies in New Zealandxxiii have placed this value at $800 000 for 
loss of life and $40 000 for injury. 
14.3.3.Factors Not Included 
In all cost benefit analysis not all areas can be covered due to the complexity and 
uncertainty associated with some of the cost and benefit streams that would result. 
In this particular study the streams not accounted are shown below ... 
Costs 
1. Interruptions to Business: The costs of relocating the business and 
recommencmg operations, also the costs of replacing lost records and 
computer files. 
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2. Cost to Fire Service: In a major fire the costs to the Fire Service may be 
large with the use of many appliances and staff members. This also covers 
the costs of injury of fire fighters undertaking their duties. 
3. Environmental Costs: Although this is a goal of the Building Code it is 
difficult to put a dollar value on lowered emissions to the environment of 
smoke and toxic run off 
4. Water Damage from False Activations and Leakage: Water damage from 
the sprinkler system activating in error and leakage from the pipework or 
heads. Statistics indicate the probability of a sprinkler system activating 
when there is not a fire present is 1 in 16 milliod and the probability of a 
quality fault in a sprinkler system leading to a leak is 1 in 60 millionxxiv. 
Therefore the associated costs would be expected to be small enough to be 
considered negligible. 
Benefits 
1. Flexibility in Escape Paths. The benefit leading from increased escape 
paths may be great if it is possible to provide the structure with one less 
escape path. The benefit will depend on whether this is possible and the 
design of the building. 
Before the results of the analysis are presented it should be noted this study may be 
conservative due to the present trend of increasing life and property safety that is 
expected to continue over the next 30 years. This is due to improved Fire Service 
performance due to improved techniques and technology and the design of new 
buildings which are becoming increasingly safe with respect to fire. These factors 
are impossible to calculate so we must presume loss rates remain as they are 
presently. 
14.4. Case 1: Low Rise Office Building 
The building considered in this section was a seven-storey office building of steel 
and concrete construction with a floor area of 400m2. The ground floor was devoted 
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to retail spaces and the upper floors were open plan office spaces. This type of 
building would be typical of many in New Zealand. At present sprinklers are not 
mandatory in this type of building so many would only be equipped with smoke or 
heat detectors and hand held fire fighting equipment. 
14.4. 1. Costs 
The cost of a sprinkler system complying with NZS 4541 was estimated for the 
building outlined above. This gave a figure of $285 000, the cost of inspection and 
maintenance as required to comply with insurance council regulations is $2 350 per 
year giving a uniform present worth of $32 350. Thus, the sprinkler related costs for 
the 30 year period are $317 350. 
Sprinkler Installation 
Sprinkler maintenance 
Table 8; Costs of utilising trade otis 
14.4.2. Benefits 
total 
Cost($) 
285 000 
32 350 
317 350 
A building as it has been described is occupied by purpose groups WL on the upper 
floors and CM on the ground floor. These types of occupancies require firecell 
ratings of 60 and 30 minutes respectively. If a sprinkler system is installed in the 
building the firecell ratings may be reduced by 50%. 
If each floor of the building is considered a firecell only the exitways and 
floor/ceiling assemblies will have to be fire rated. 
The costs of various fire rated elements are shown in Table 9xxv, these figures have 
been compiled by independent quantity surveyors and includes the costs of all 
labour, materials, plant and handling. 
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Rating Material Cost 
(ruins) ($/m2l 
~~--------~-~-------------~---,---------------------~----
15 9.5 Standard Gib 82.25 
30 12.5 Standard Gib 89.17 
60 12.5 Fyreline 90.41 
Table 9; Costs of Passive Floor/Ceiling Systems 
F and S ratings 
The buildings F rating requirements may be lowered from 60 to 30 minutes this 
would means a reduction in cost per metre squared of firecell rated wall of (90.41-
89.17) or $1.24/m2 . Every floor/ceiling assembly in this structure must be fire rated 
giving a total area of ( 400 x 6) or 2400 m2. 15% will be added to this figure to 
include items such as firestopping of holes for services, fire rated doors, and other F 
ratings required by the approved documents giving a total area of2760 m2. 
Therefore the benefit provided by reduced F rating requirements is (2760 x 1.24) or 
$3422. 
It can be safely assumed a building of this type must have an S rating as they are 
most often found on the outskirts of CBD's in densely packed groups. Table A1 of 
the fire safety annex of the approved documents indicates both of these purpose 
groups are fire hazard category 2. 
If we assume an Av/ Af ratio of 0. 05 and an AJ Af ratio of Table 1 in section C3 of the 
approved documents gives a te of 130 minutes. If sprinklers are installed this figure 
may be reduced by 50%. 
Passive protection for the structure is difficult to estimate due to the method of 
quoting coverings per metre sqaured. Consultation with quantity surveyors has 
indicated an approximate figure for the passive protection required for this building 
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would be $100 000. If the required rating was halved to 65 minutes the protection 
wouold cost approximatly $60 000, giving a net benefit of$40 000. 
Fatalities and Injuries 
Fire service incident reports}.."-'Vi show an average of 159 fires in buildings of this type 
over the period 1986-1992 In these fires there was 1 fatality in a sprinklered 
building. Therefore over the period of the study we will predict 5 deaths in buildings 
of this type where sprinklers are not present. 
Over the same period 32 injuries in unsprinklered buildings and 2 injuries in 
sprinklered buildings were reported. Therefore predictions for injury in a sprinklered 
and unsprinklered office buildings are 10 and 160 respectively. 
If we assume there are 550 buildings of this type in the countryx;...,-ii (and there will be 
for the next 30 years) will can calculate the figures in Table 10 
Probability of Cost of death Probability of Cost of injury 
death injury 
·~~ ............... ~~--~-·· ........... ~-·~~~-····· .. ·· ....... ~~"'' ,.~~-···--··~ .... .... -~ ....... ~ 
Sprinklered 0 0 0.0036 144 
U nsprinklered 0.0091 7280 0.0582 2328 
Table 10; Costs of fatalities and injuries in office buildings 
Therefore the benefits of utilising the trade off clauses for buildings of this type are 
(7280-0) or 7280 for fatalities and (2328-144) or 2184 for injuries. 
Insurance 
A building of this type would be worth approximately 20 million dollars and 
insurance rates for office blocks are in the order of $0.015 - 0.02 per $100 coverx;...'Viii. 
Therefore, the insurance premium for the building will be $4000 at most. The 
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reductions in premiums given by insurance companies vary greatly from company to 
company and would also be judged on other factors such as the buildings fire history. 
Generally a 20% discount is given to a building with no peculiarities. Thus the 
expected saving in this case is estimated as $800 per year. Taking this cost over 30 
years gives a uniform present worth of $11 000 
Property 
If we consider there are 550 buildings of this type in the country and we predict (159 
x 30) or 4 770 fires over the course of this study the probability of a fire occurring in 
any structure of this type is 8.67, that is this event would be expected to occur over 8 
times in each building during the study period.. It is known from the risk analysis 
already completed that 60% of fires in sprinkled buildings are too small to operate 
the sprinklers (based on fire service statistics), therefore in 5.2 of these 8.67 fires the 
fire would be expected to be confined to the object of origin and the damage would 
be minimal. This leaves us with 3.45 major events. 
It is estimated that the total loss of fires in this type of building over the next 30 
years will be between 600-650 million dollars which would average to $136 300 per 
incident. Thus the total saving for this analysis is (3.45 x 136 300) $470 235. 
If sprinklers are present the damage to the structure would be expected to be minor 
in 99.97% of cases which would place the probability of a major event occurring in 
this structure at 0.0010 which corresponds to a dollar value of $136. When 
sprinklers activate property losses per event will be reduced to $20,000 giving an 
expected loss over the study of (3.45 x 20 000) or $69 000. 
These figures indicate a net benefit where sprinklers are installed of (470 235 - 69 
136) or $401 099. 
Benefit($) 
~· ".... . ...... -~-- ...................... " ·~· . . . . . ..... --~-- ~- .. . . . . 
Reduced F ratings 3 422 
Reduced S ratings 40 000 
Savings oflife 7 280 
Savings of injury 2 184 
Savings of property 401 23 5 
Savings in insurance 11 000 
total 465 121 
Table 11; Benefits of utilising trade offs 
Therefore the outcome for this case is shown in Table 12 
·,• •,• • ~;· •.• "' c ,.,. t o~·,c~c cc~,.~"'' "' occo·. · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · • · · ·,•,. •.· c ··"·>' c;c c · :.c c · · ,_, ... ,,, · .,,,• '•'•'•"' ;•, o,·,· c :,·,,_,_ ·,c ·-·,c;·,· ·,· · ._, • • c • ·-· co • "'-"•'-"•;· · · · 
Office Building 
Benefits 
Costs 
Benefits-Costs 
Table 12; Results of analysis on office building 
......•.....• -.- ---~ .... 
465 121 
317 350 
147 771 
14.5. Case 2: Warehouse Building 
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The warehouse chosen for this analysis is typical of distribution or storage 
warehouses seen throughout the country at transport centres such as airports or rail 
yards. The structure has been taken as 60 metres long and 30 metres wide with a 
ceiling of 8 metres. 
14.5.1.Costs 
A sprinkler system for a building such as this would be much cheaper than the 
previous example due to the reduced covered area and the open plan design of the 
structure. The cost was taken as $86 500xxii with an annual inspection fee of $2000 
for inspection and maintenance yielding a UPW of $27 530. 
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Cost($) 
...... ._ ···------~~-~--~~ ................... _. ..... ······---~~---~~----·---~-----~-~~-
Sprinkler Installation 86 500 
Sprinkler Maintenance 27 530 
total 114 030 
Table 13; Costs of utilising trade oft's 
14.5.2.Benefits 
F and S Ratings 
A building such as this requires limitation of the firecell area to 1500 m2. To limit 
the size a partition is required across the shortest width of the structure. The area of 
the partition will be required to be 240m2 and would be expected to cost (82.25 x 
240) or $3 290. If the building contains sprinklers this division is not required 
producing a benefit for this example of$3 240. 
This building will also require an S rating as they are often on small properties and 
near boundaries. Table A1 of the fire safety annex of the approved documents 
indicates this building would have a fire hazard category 3. 
It can be assumed this building will have an Av/Afratio of0.12 (considering a large 
open door at each end) and an AJAr ratio of 0 Table 1 in section C3 of the approved 
documents gives a te of 116 minutes. If sprinklers are installed this figure may be 
reduced by 50%. 
Once again the figures for passive protection on structural elements has been 
approximated due to the detailed information reuired for accurate pricing. To 
protecte a building of this type with a 116 minute rating would be expected to cost 
$40 000, if the requirement was lowered to 58 minutes the approximate cost would 
be $30 000. Therefore, the net benefit due to lowered structural protection is $10 
000. 
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Fatalities and Injuries 
Fire Service incident reports show an average of 116 fires in buildings of this type 
over the period 1986-1992 in these fires there were no fatalities. 
Over the same period 6 injuries in unsprinklered buildings and 1 injury in sprinklered 
buildings were reported. Therefore it could be expected the number of injuries in 
sprinklered and unsprinklered buildings of this type to be 30 and 5 respectively over 
the period of the study. 
There are 700 buildings of this type in the country:-."'Vii (and it can be assumed there 
will be for the next 30 years) this gives the figures in Table 14. 
,_.,~~" :o-::::":;:·.·.o:.-.-:<:·>00" -- - • 
Probability of Cost of death Probability of Cost of injury 
death injury 
~~~~-· '"···~- .. ~-~-~~"' '" ......... " ... ~-~~ ... ~ ................. -~ ........ ~---~ ...... ~ .... ~ ... .. 
Sprinklered 0 0 0.0071 
Unsprinklered 0 0 0.0429 
Table 14; Costs of fatalities and injuries in office buildings 
286 
1716 
Therefore there is no benefit from improved life safety in this building, injury costs 
reduce from 1716 to 286 yielding a benefit of$1430. 
Insurance 
A building of this type would be worth approximately 1 million dollars and 
insurance rates for warehouses are in the order of $0.02- 0.023 per $100 coverXA'Viii. 
Therefore, the insurance premium for the building will be $230 at most. Using the 
same 20% reduction rate on premiums the building owner will save $46. Taking this 
cost over 30 years gives a uniform present worth of $633 
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Property 
If we consider there are 700 buildings of this type in the country and we predict ( 116 
x 30) or 3 480 fires over the course of this study the probability of a fire occurring in 
any structure of this type is 4.917 .. Once again 60% of these fires are discounted as 
minor leaving 1.97 major incidents per building in the 30 year period. 
It is estimated that the total loss of fires in this type of building over the next 30 
years will be between 1400-1500 million dollars which would average to 402 298 
dollars per incident 
Expected losses due to fires in buildings of this type over the next 30 years is 
expected to be 1400 1500 million which would average $431 034 per incident. Thus 
the total losses in unsprinklered buildings is (1.97 x 431 034) or $849 137. 
If sprinklers are present the damage to the structure would be expected to be minor 
in 99.97% of cases which would place the probability of a major event occurring in 
this structure at 0.0591 which corresponds to a dollar value of25 470 dollars. When 
sprinklers activate property losses per event will be reduced to 3 8 000 dollars giving 
an expected loss over the study of (1.97 x 38 000) or $74 860. 
These figures indicate a net benefit where sprinklers are installed of (849 137 - 74 
860) or $774 277. 
Reduced F ratings 
Reduced S ratings 
Savings oflife 
Savings of injury 
Savings of property 
Savings in insurance 
Table 15; Benefits of utilising trade offs 
total 
Benefit($) 
3240 
10 000 
0 
1430 
774 277 
633 
789 580 
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Thus the results of the cost benefit analysis for a warehouse building are shown in 
Table 16 
Benefits 
Costs 
Benefits-Costs 
Warehouse 
Table 16; Benefits- Costs for warehouse analysis 
14.6. Conclusions 
789 580 
114 030 
675 550 
The cost benefit analysis has shown that although the savings from reduced passive 
protection are minor compared to the costs involved in installing a sprinkler system, 
other benefits make it an attractive economical proposition. 
Although the savings through utilising the trade offs are not large the lives that are 
predicted to be saved could He valued much higher than the accepted figures used 
increasing the attractiveness of the trade off case. 
Another point of interest is the low fatality rate in the two property types examined. 
If a rest home or institution were to be examined the savings from reduced number 
of expected fatalities would be much higher. 
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15. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The general conclusion from this study is that sprinkler trade offs are a valuable tool 
in fire protection in this country. If for no other reason than they encourage building 
owners to install sprinklers. The installation of sprinklers will increase the overall 
life safety of the building, provided the trade offs are not excessive. 
A method for determining the correct level of trade off is difficult to establish due to 
the fact that active and passive systems are two distinct types of protection with two 
different methods and goals. It is considered illogical, however, to totally remove 
some measure of passive protection because there is always a possibility of a 
sprinkler failure. 
The level of trade offs in passive systems allowed by the Approved Documents 
appears to provide a bare minimum of life safety in the event of a sprinkler failure. 
If we are to rely on passive systems in buildings when sprinklers fail, efforts must be 
made to ensure the passive systems do not fail as well. 
Although the trade offs allowed in the Approved Documents are acceptable for life 
safety, they may result in increased property losses in some cases. In specific 
situations where property protection may be lowered by the removal of some passive 
systems, it may be prudent for the building owner to not use all of the permitted 
trade offs, especially if the contents of the building are valuable or considered vital 
to business. 
Another important point is the fact sprinkler trade offs can only be considered safe if 
the sprinkler reliability rate in this country remains at a level seen in the past. If 
significant changes were to be made to the way sprinklers are installed, maintained 
and controlled the problem would have to be reconsidered. 
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A-1 
Appendicies 
A-2 
New Zealand Building Code Section C2/AS1 
2.5.2 Sprinklers 
Where the firecell is protected by a sprinkler system (fire 
safety precaution type 6), open path lengths given in Table 3 
may be increased by 50% 
A-3 
A-4 
New Zealand Building Code Section C3/AS1 
2.0 FIRECELLS 
2.4 Protected Shafts 
2.4.2 Every protected shaft shall be a seperate firecell within the 
firecell or firecells in which it is located. The shaft walls 
between each floor shall have a FRR of no less than the 
highest F rating of any firecell abutting at that level, or 
30/30/30, whichever is greater. The FRR shall be applied to 
the external face of the fire seperation surrounding the 
protected shaft. 
2.4.3 In sprinklered buildings the F rating of the protected shaft 
may be reduced by 30 minutes, but shall be no less than 
30/30/30 
2.5 Purpose Groups CS and CL 
2.5.2 IfCS or CL spaces are sprinklered the FRR requirements of 
2. 5.1 may be reduced as follows 
a) Firecells having fire separations with a FRR of 
15/15/15 may be replaced with smokecells 
(and) 
b) Provided the occupant load in the firecell is not 
greater than 1000, the FRR of fire separations may 
be reduced from 30/30/30 to 15/15/15 
2.5.3 Theatres 
.... Where the stage and supporting areas are sprinklered 
as required by Paragraph 9.9.1, the proscenium wall and 
curtain may be a smoke separation. The openings in fire rated 
proscenium walls shall be protected as required by Paragraph 
5.4 
2. 7 Purpose group CO 
2. 7.1 Any enclosed usable space beneath tiered seating shall be a 
firecell with a rating of no less the F30. This provision need 
not apply if the lower space is sprinklered 
2. 8 Purpose groups SC and SD 
2. 8 .1 0 Provisions and requirements for sprinklers 
a) Where the sleeping area is sprinklered 
i) the maximum number of beds permitted by 
Paragraphs 2.8.2 2.8.3 and 2.8.5 may be 
doubled if the sleeping area is a single 
firecell, and 
ii) The FRR of 60/60/60 required by 
Paragraph 2.8.2 may be reduced by 
30/30/30, and the FRR 30/30/30 required 
by Paragraph 2.8.5 reduced to 15/15/15 
2.9 Purpose group SA 
2.9.7 Provision and Requirements for sprinklers 
Where an SA purpose group sleeping area is sprinklered 
a) The number of beds allowed under 
Paragraph 2.9.2 may be doubled 
b) Provided the number ofbeds in each firecell 
is no greater than 60, the FRR of fire 
separations between adjacent sleeping areas 
may be reduced from 30/30/30 to 15/15/15 
A-5 
Amd 3. Dec '95 
Amd 3. Dec'95 
Amd 3. Dec '95 
Amd 1. Dec '93 
A-6 
2.11 Purpose group IE 
2.11. 5 Provision for sprinklers 
Where firecells adjacent to the safe path are sprinklered, 
the FRR' s required by Paragraph 2.11.2 may be reduced 
to 15/15/15 and 30/30/30 respectively, but to not less 
than the F rating for each purpose group as determined 
from Table B 1 
2.12 Purpose group IA 
2.12.5 FRR's for building elements in car parking spaces shall be 
based on the S rating as derived from the formula: 
S = Ctc (but in no case less than 15 minutes) 
Where te (equivalent time of fire exposure in minutes) is 
derived from Table 1, and C is a variable having the 
following values: 
For fire separations between firecells: 
C = 1.0 ifunsprinklered, or 
= 0.5 if sprinklered 
For floors and supporting elements within the car 
parking fire cell: 
C = 0.5 ifunsprinklered 
= 0.25 if sprinklered 
2.14 Cross lease titles, company lease titles and unit titles 
2.14.2 When a building is subdivided (as in Paragraph 2.14.1) and 
all the titles and any areas in common are sprinklered 
throughout, the requirements for fire separations of Paragraph 
2.14.1 b) need not apply 
2.16 Wood and wood products 
2.16.1 Floors 
ln any firecell which has another firecell below, and 
where the required F or S rating is: 
a) 60 minutes or more, the flooring within that firecell 
shall, if constructed of wood products, be covered by 
a non-combustible overlay, unless the firecell is 
sprinklered 
b) 30 minutes or less, the flooring may be of wood 
products, provided it has a thickness of no less than 
20mm 
2.16.2 Walls and ceilings 
In any firecell, when the required For S rating is: 
a) 60 minutes or more, and the internal walls and 
ceilings are lined with wood or wood products 
thicker than 1. Omm, unless the firecell is sprinklered 
the S rating shall be increased by applying the 
requirements of the next higher fire hazard category 
ofTable 1 
Amd 1. Dec '93 
Amd 1. Dec '93 
Amd 1. Dec '93 
2.17 Fire service vehicular access 
2.17.1 Where buildings are located remote from the street 
boundaries of a property, pavements situated on the property 
and likely to be used for vehicular access by fire appliances 
shall: 
e) Provide access to within 18m of at least one side of 
the building, except that when a building is 
sprinklered and has a fire riser main installed, access 
need only be to within 18m of the inlets to these 
systems 
3.0 FIRE RESISTANCE RATINGS 
3. 7 Special requirements 
3.7.3 When a firecell is sprinklered, except when purpose groups 
require subdivision or other area limitations are imposed by 
this Approved Document, the firecell floor area may be 
unlimited 
4.0 EXTERNAL WALLS AND ROOFS 
4.4 Vertical flame spread 
4.4.5 Except when the firecells are sprinklered, one of the 
measures described in Paragraphs 4.4.6 to 4.4.7 shall be 
provided where either of the following conditions occur: 
a) Firecells containing purpose groups SC, SD, SA, SR 
or IE are one or more levels above the final exit, or 
b) Firecells containing purpose group CM are two or 
more levels above the final exit. 
4.8 Roofs 
4.8.3 When an external exitway crosses a roof, or is above or 
adjacent to a roof on the same or another building, unless the 
firecell below the roof is sprinklered, the roof within 3.0m of 
any part of the exitway, and all supporting elements, shall 
have a FRR of 30/30/30. Primary elements of the exitway 
shall be non combustible. 
5.0 CLOSURES IN FIRE AND SMOKE SEPARATIONS 
5. 5 Protected shafts 
5.5.3 For purpose groups other than SC and SD, the smokecell 
may be omitted where the firecell is sprinklered and has an 
automatic smoke detection system. 
8.0 SURFACE FINISHES, FLOOR COVERINGS AND 
SUSPENDED FLEXffiLE FABRICS 
8.1 General Principles 
8.1.5 Sprinklered spaces 
In firecells equipped with sprinklers, only the ceilings 
need comply with the SFI and SDI requirements of Table 
4 
8.2.3 In firecells equipped with sprinklers the flooring need not 
comply with the requirements in Paragraph 8.2.1 
A-7 
Amd 1. Dec '93 
Amd 2. Aug '94 
A-8 
Uniform Building Code, USA 
Sec 506 Allowable area Increases 
3. (c) Automatic Sprinkler Systems 
The areas specified in Table No. 5-c and section 505 (b) may 
be tripled in 1 storey buildings and doubled in buildings of 
more than one storey if the building is provided with an 
automatic sprinkler system throughout. The area increases 
permitted in this subsection may be compounded with that 
specified in section 1, 2, or 3 of subsection (a) of this section. 
The increases permitted in this subsection will not apply when 
automatic sprinkler systems are installed under the following 
provisions. 
1. Section 507 for an increase in allowable number of 
stories. 
2. Section 3802 (f) for group H, Divisions 1, 2, and 3 
occupancies 
3. Substitution for a 1 hour fire resistive construction 
pursuant to Section 508 
4. Section 1716, Atria. 
Sec 508 Fire Resistive Substitution 
When an approved automatic sprinkler system is not required 
throughout a building by other sections of this code, it may be 
used in a building of type II one hour construction, Type III 
one hour and type V one hour construction to substitute for 
the one hour fire resistant construction. Such substitution shall 
not waive or reduce the required fire resistive construction 
for: 
(a) Occupancy separations [section 503 (c)] 
(b) Exterior wall protection due to proximity of property 
lines [Section 504 (b)] 
(c) Area separations [Section 505 (f)] 
(d) Dwelling Unit separations [Section 1202 (b)] 
(e) Shaft enclosures [Section 1706] 
(f) Corridors [Section 3305 (g) and (h)] 
(g) Stair enclosures [Section 3309] 
(h) Exit passageways [Section 3312 (a)] 
(i) Boiler, Central heating plant or hot water supply boiler 
room enclosures. 
Sec 509 Pedestrian Walkways 
(c) Maximum Length. The length of a pedestrian walkway 
shall not exceed 300 feet 
EXCEPTIONS 1. Pedestrian walkways that are fully 
sprinklered may be up to 400 feet in length 
A-9 
Sec 702 Construction, 
Height and Allowable 
Area 
A-10 
(b) Special Provisions. 1. Group B division 1 with Group A 
division 3; Group B division 2 or Group R, division 1 
occupancy above. Other provisions of this code 
notwithstanding, a basement or first story of a building 
may be considered as a separate and distinct building for 
the purposes of area limitations, limitation of number of 
stories and type of construction, when all of the following 
conditions are met 
A The basement or first storey is of Type I construction 
and is separated from the building above with a three 
hour occupancy separation 
B. The building above the three hour occupancy separation 
contains only Group A division 3, Group B division 2, 
or Group R division 1 occupancies 
C. the building below the three hour occupancy separation 
is used exclusively for the parking or storage of private 
or pleasure type vehicles 
EXCEPTIONS 2. Group B division 2 office and retail 
occupancies in additional to those incident to the 
operation of the building (including storage areas) 
provided that the entire structure below the three hour 
occupancy separation is protected throughout by an 
automatic sprinkler system. 
2. Group B division 2 Storage Areas. Storage areas in 
connection with wholesale or retail sales in Division 2 
occupancies shall be separated from the public areas by a 
1 hour fire resistive occupancy separation. 
EXCEPTIONS: Occupancy separation need not be 
provided when any one of the following conditions 
exists 
A The storage area does not exceed 1000 square 
feet, or 
B. The storage area is sprinklered and does not 
exceed 3000 square feet, or 
C. The building is provided with an automatic 
sprinkler system throughout. Area increases as 
specified in section 506 (c) are permitted. 
Sec 706 Shaft and Exit Enclosures 
Exits shall be enclosed as specified in Chapter 33 
Elevator shafts, vent shafts and other openings through 
floors shall be enclosed, and the enclosures shall be 
specified in section 1706 
EXCEPTIONS: In Group B division 4 occupancies, 
exits shall be enclosed as specified in chapter 33, but 
other through floor openings need not be enclosed. 
In buildings housing group B occupancies equipped with 
automatic sprinkler systems throughout, enclosures need 
not be provided for escalators where the top of the 
escalator opening at each story is provided with a draft 
curtain and automatic sprinklers are installed around the 
perimeter of the opening within 2 feet of the draft curtain. 
The draft curtain shall enclose the perimeter of the 
unenclosed opening and extend from the ceiling 
downwards at least 12 inches on all sides. The spacing 
between sprinklers may not exceed 6 feet. 
Sec 802 Construction Height and Allowable Area 
(c) Special Provisions. Rooms in division 1 and 2 occupancies 
used for kindergarten, first or second grade pupils and 
division 3 occupancies shall not be located above or below 
the first storey, except for basements that have required 
exits at grade level. 
EXCEPTIONS: 1. In buildings equipped with automatic 
sprinkler systems throughout, rooms used in 
kindergartens, first and second grade children or for 
day care purposes may be located on the second 
storey, provided there are at least two exits directly to 
the exterior for the exclusive use of the occupants, or 
2. In buildings equipped with an automatic sprinkler system 
throughout and of Type I or Type 2 fire resistive 
construction, day care facilities are permitted to be located 
above the first floor when 
A The entire storey on which the day care facility is 
located is equipped with an approved fire alarm and 
smoke detection system as set forth in the fire code. 
Actuation of the system shall sound an audible alarm 
through the day care facility; and 
B. The day care facility is divided into two areas with a 20 
minute fire resistive separation. 
C. Each area is provided with air moving equipment 
D. Each area has no fewer than two exits 
A-ll 
A-12 
Sec. 1002 Construction Height and Allowable Area 
(a) General. Buildings or parts of buildings classed in Group I 
because of the use or character of the occupancy shall be 
limited to the types of construction set forth in tables nos. 
5-C and no. 5-D and shall not exceed in area or height, the 
limits specified in sections 505, 506 and 507 
EXCEPTIONS: 1. Hospital and nursing homes specified as 
Group I division 1.1 occupancies that are equipped with an 
automatic sprinkler system throughout shall not exceed 1 
storey in height v,rhen in Type III 1 hour, Type IV or Type 
V 1 hour construction 
Sec 1211. Fire Alarm Systems 
Group R division 1 occupancies shall be provided with an 
approved manual and automatic fire alarm system in 
apartment houses 3 or more stories in height or containing 
16 or more dwelling units, in hotels 3 or more stories in 
height or containing 20 or more guest rooms and in 
congregate residences three or more stories in height and 
having an occupancy of 20 or more. A fire alarm and 
communicating system shall be provided in Group R division 
1 occupancies located in a high rise building. 
EXCEPTIONS: 2. A manual fire alarm need not be 
provided in a building which is protected throughout by 
an approved supervised fire sprinkler system having a 
local alarm to notifY all occupants. 
Sec. 1704 Vertical Fire Spread at Exterior Wails 
(c) Exterior. When openings in an exterior wall are above and 
within 5 feet laterally of an opening in the storey below, 
such openings shall be separated by an approved flame 
barrier eJ...1:ending 30 inches beyond the exterior wall in the 
plane of the floor or by an approved vertical flame barrier 
not less than 3 feet high measured vertically above the top 
of the lower opening. Flame barriers shall have a fire 
resistance of not less than % of an hour. 
EXCEPTIONS: 1. Flame barriers are not required in a 
building equipped with an approved automatic sprinkler 
system throughout. 
Sec 1713 Foam Plastic Insulation 
(d) Thermal Barrier. The interior of the building shall be 
separated from the foam plastic insulation by an approved 
thermal barrier having an index of 15 when tested in 
accordance with UBC Standard no. 17-3. The thermal 
barrier shall be installed in such a manner that it will remain 
in place for the time of its index classification based on 
approved diversified tests. 
EXCEPTIONS: The thermal barrier is not required: 
E. In cooler and freezer walls when 
(iv) Is protected by an automatic sprinkler system. When 
the cooler or freezer is within a building, both the 
cooler or freezer and that part of the building in which 
it is located shall be sprinklered. 
Sec. 1716 Atria 
(c) Enclosure of Atria 
Fixed glazed openings in the atrium enclosure shall be 
equipped with fire windows having fire resistive rating of 
not less than % hour, and the total area of such openings 
shall not exceed 25% of the area of the common wall 
between the atria and the room into which the opening is 
provided. 
EXCEPTIONS: 2. Guest rooms, dwelling units, congregate 
residences and tenant spaces may be separated from the 
atrium by approved fixed wire glass set in steel frames. In 
lieu thereof, temeed or laminated glass or listed glass block 
may be used, subject to the following 
A The glass shall be protected by a sprinkler system 
equipped with listed quick response sprinklers. The 
sprinkler system shall completely wet the entire surface 
of the glass wall when actuated. Where there are 
walking surfaces on both sides of the glass both sides of 
the glass shall be so protected. 
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Sec 1807 Special 
Provisions for Group 
B division 2 Office 
Buildings and Group 
A-14 
R division 1 Occupancies 
(c) Automatic Sprinkler Systems 
2. Modifications. The following modifications of the code 
requirements are permitted. 
A. The fire resistive time periods set out in table 17-A may 
be reduced one hour for interior bearing walls, exterior 
bearing and non bearing walls, roofs and beams 
supporting roofs, provided they do not frame in to 
columns. Vertical shafts other than stairway enclosures 
and elevator shafts may be reduced to one hour when 
sprinklers are installed within the shafts at alternate 
floors. The fire resistive time period reduction as 
specified herein shall not apply to exterior bearing and 
non bearing walls whose fire resistive rating has already 
been reduced under the exceptions contained within 
Section 1803 (a) or 1903 (a) 
B. Except for corridors in Group B, division 2 and Group 
R, division 1 occupancies and partitions separating 
dwelling units or guest rooms, all interior non bearing 
partitions required to be 1 hour fire resistive 
construction by Table no. 17-A may be of non 
combustible construction without a fire resistive time 
period. 
C. Travel distance to the most remote point in the floor 
area to a horizontal exit or to an enclosed stainvay may 
be 300 feet. 
D. Fire dampers, other than those needed to protect floor 
ceiling assemblies to maintain the fire resistance of the 
assembly, are not required. 
E. Emergency windows required by section 1204 are not 
required. 
(h) Elevators. 1. Elevators on all floors shall open in to elevator 
lobbies which are separated from the remainder of the 
building, including corridors and other exits, by walls 
extending from the floor to the underside of the fire resistive 
floor or roof above. Such walls shall not be of less than 1 
hour fire resistive construction. Openings through such walls 
shall conform to section 3305 
EXCEPTIONS: 3. In fully sprinklered office buildings, 
corridors may lead through enclosed elevator lobbies if 
all areas of the building have access to at least one 
required exit without passing through the elevator lobby. 
Sec 2516 General Construction Requirements 
(t) Fire Blocks and Draft Stops 
(ii) Two or More Dwelling Units and Hotels. Draft stops 
shall be installed in the attics, mansards, overhangs, false 
fronts set out from walls and similar concealed spaces of 
buildings containing more than one dwelling unit and in 
hotels. Such draft stops shall be above and in line with 
walls separating individual dwelling units and guest rooms 
from each other and from other uses. 
EXCEPTIONS: 2. Where approved sprinklers are 
installed, the area between draft stops may be 9000 
square feet and the greatest horizontal dimension may be 
100 feet. 
Sec. 5207 Skylights 
(a) General 
4. Each skylight unit may have may have a maximum area 
within the curb of I 00 square feet for CC2 material and 
200 square feet for CCI material 
EXCEPTIONS: 2. Except for Groups A, divisions 1 and 2 
and H, divisions 1 and 2 occupancies the maximum area 
within the curb need not be limited where skylights are. 
B. Used in a building completely equipped with an 
approved automatic sprinkler system complying with 
UBC Standard no. 38-1 or 38-3 
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Building Code of Australia (Section C - Fire 
Resistance) 
C2.3 Large Isolated Buildings 
The size of a fire compartment in a building may exceed that 
specified in Table C2.2 where -
(a) the building does not exceed 18 000 m2 in floor area 
nor exceed 108 000 m3in volume if-
(ii) the building is of any class and is protected 
throughout with a sprinkler system and perimeter 
vehicular access complying with C2.4(b) is provided ; 
or 
(b) the building exceeds 18 000 m2 in floor area or 108 
000 m3 in volume, is protected throughout with a 
sprinkler system, is provided with a perimeter vehicular 
access complying with 2.4(b) and if-
(i) the ceiling height of the fire compartment is not 
more than 12m, it has a smoke exhaust system in 
accordance with Specification E2.6 or smoke and 
heat vents in accordance with E2.5; or 
(ii) the ceiling height is more than 12m, it has a smoke 
exhaust system in accordance with specification 
E2.6; or 
(c) there is more than one building on the allotment -
(i) each building must comply with (a) or (b); or 
(ii) if the buildings are closer than 6m to each other 
they are regarded as one building and collectively 
must comply with (a) or (b). 
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C2.6 Vertical Separation 
of Openings in 
External Wails 
A-18 
If a building (other than an open deck carpark or an open 
spectator stand) which is required to be of Type A construction 
and does not have a sprinkler system, any part of a window or 
other opening in an external wall (except openings within the 
same stairwell)-
(i) is above another opening in the storey next below; and 
(ii) its vertical projection falls no farther than 450mm 
outside the lower opening (measured horizontally), 
the openings must be separated by -
(a) a spandrel which-
(i) is not less than 900mm in height; and 
(ii) extends not less than 600mm above the upper surface 
of the intervening floor; and 
(iii) is of non-combustible material having a FRL not less 
than 60/60/60; or 
(b) part of a curtain wall or panel wall that complies with (a); 
or 
(c) construction that complies with (a) behind a curtain wall 
or panel wall and has any gaps packed with non 
combustible material that will withstand thermal 
expansion and structural movement of the wall without 
loss of seal against fire and smoke; or 
(d) a slab or other horizontal construction that -
(i) projects outwards from the external face of the wall 
not less than 11 OOmm; and 
(ii) extends along the wall no less than 450mm beyond the 
openings concerned; and 
(iii) is non-combustible and has a FRL of not less than 
60/60/60; or 
(e) other construction which is equally as effective as (a), (b), 
(c), or (d) 
C2. 7 Separation by Fire 
Walls 
A part of a building separated from the remainder of the building 
by a fire wall is treated as a separate building if-
(d) where the roof of one of the adjoining parts is lower than 
the roof of the other part, the fire wall extends to the 
underside of-
(iii) the lower roof if its covering is non combustible and 
the lower part has a sprinkler system, 
or the design of the building must otherwise restrict the spread of 
fire from the lower part to the higher part. 
C2.10 Separation ofLift Shafts 
Lifts connecting more than 2 storeys, or more than 3 storeys if 
the building is sprinklered, (other than lifts which are wholly 
within an atrium) must be separated from the remainder of the 
building by enclosure in a shaft which -
(a) in a building required to be of Type A construction - the 
walls have the relevant FRL prescribed by Specification 
Cl.l; 
(b) in a building required to be of Type B construction the 
walls are-
(i) in accordance with (a) if the shaft is loadbearing; or 
(ii) of non-combustible construction if the shaft is non 
loadbearing ; and 
(c) openings for lift landing doors and services are protected 
in accordance with Part C3 
C3.4 Acceptable Methods for Protection 
(a) Where protection is required , doorways and windows 
and other openings must be protected as follows; 
(i) Doorways - external wall wetting sprinklers or 
60/60/60 fire doors (self closing or automatic closing) 
(ii) Windows - external wall wetting sprinklers 60/60/-
fire windows (automatic or permanently fixed in the 
closed position) or 60/60/- automatic fire shutters 
(iii) Other openings - external wall wetting sprinklers or 
construction not having an FRL not less than 60/60/-
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Building Code of Australia (Section D Access 
and Egress) 
D1.3 When Fire Isolated Exits are Required 
(b) Class 5 to 9 Buildings - Every exit must be fire isolated 
unless 
(i) It doesw not connect more than 2 consecutive storeys 
(ii) It is part of an open spectator stand 
(iii) It does not connect more than 3 consecutive storeys 
if the building has a sprinkler system installed 
throughout. 
C 1.12 Non Required Stairways Ramps or Escalators 
(b) may connect any number of storeys if it is:-
(iii) In a class 5 or 6 building that is sprinklered 
throughout 
(c) except where permitted in (b) must not connect more 
than 
(i) 3 storeys if each of those storeys is provided with 
a sprinkler system throughout. 
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NZS 1900 Chapter 5 (1988) 
MffiNDMENTS INCORPORATED IN THE 1984 EDITION 
No. Date of Description 
Issue 
Notes 
---~-~-~~-----~- ------~~--------------------~--------------------------·- -------------····-
12 
1 
24/7/78 Additional "credits" for 
automatic sprinlder 
systems ..... 
22/10/87 ... editorial changes in relation 
to references to automatic 
sprinlder systems within the 
text. 
Incorporated 
in this 
edition 
FORWARD TO THE 1984 EDITION, INCORPORATING 
AMENDMENTNo. 16 
1. Major changes were introduced by Amendment No. 12 (1978), 
especially with the insertion of table 1~ which permitted 
lowering of "types of construction" required where sprinlder 
protection is provided, thus enabling more extensive use of 
timber structural elements .... 
5.10.4 
When a fire compartment is protected by an approved automatic 
sprinlder system then; 
Either 
(a) The maximum area permitted by clause 5.9 shall be doubled 
when the sprinlder system is single supply and shall be 
unlimited when the sprinlder system is double supply 
or 
(b) Table 1A may be used instead of table 1, whether the 
sprinlder system is double or single supply, provided this shall 
not apply to cases where a sprinlder system is required by 
5.52 (certain shops), 5.89.1 (D2 and D3 buildings exceeding 
24.4m in height) or 5.90.1 (any building exceeding 45.7m in 
height). 
Provided that no account shall be taken of any sprinkler 
system if, in the opinion of the Engineer, the contents of the 
fire compartment are such that the application of water would 
be ineffective or may be dangerous. 
5.12.6 
where approved 
i. Thermally operated sealed drenchers 
ii. Automatically controlled open drenchers 
iii. Manually operated drenchers are installed and maintained in 
an approved manner to deliver water upon the outer surface 
of external walls including openings there in the percentage of 
window openings may be doubled 
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5.14.3 
Subclause 5.14.1 (fire resistance of external walls) shall not apply 
when all the members on which the wall depends for its stability 
are in a fire compartment or part of a fire compartment protected 
by an approved automatic sprinkler system. 
TABLE3 
INTERNAL F.R.R. FOR TYPES 
CONSTRUCTION 
1, AND 3 
MINIMUM FIRE RESISTANCE RATINGS IN HOURS FOR 
ELEMENTS OF STRUCTURE OTHER THAN EXTERNAL 
AND FIRE WALLS AND FIRE PARTITIONS 
Applies to types 1,2, and 3 construction only; for types 4 and 5 
construction refer to clause 5 .21.3 and footnotes to tables 1 and 
1A (c) 
Occupancy classification Fire Risk 
group clause 5.6 division 
A Assembly ptltposes 
Accommodation 
dwellings for 
B .I. Persons nnder 
restraint 
B.2. Persons needing 
attention 
B.3. Normal persons 
C. I. Multi-Unit 
dwellings 
C.2. Double and single 
unit dwellings 
Corruhetoial and 
Industrial 
D.l. 
D.2. 
D.3. 
NOTE-
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Moderate 
High 
Concrete floors, 
columns, bearing 
walls, and main 
beams supporting 
concrete floors 
l(a) 
l(a) 
l(a) 
l(a) 
l(a) 
l(a) 
l(a) 
Ph (a) 
2!/, (a) 
Columns, bearing 
wall, and main 
beams supporting 
roof members 
l(b) 
l(b) 
l(b) 
I (b) 
y, 
y, 
I (b) 
l(b) 
l(b) 
( a) Where the fire compartment exceeds four storeys the F.R.R. 
in column 3 shall be increased by Yz hr. See clauses 5.16.1 and 
5.17.1 
(b) 1/z hr. F.R.R. when the fire compartment is protected by an 
approved automatic sprinkler system 
(c) Clauses 5.12.l(b), 5.16, 5.17, 5.21 and 5.22 should be read in 
conjunction with this table 
5.20.2 
Where approved automatic sprinkler protection is provided in 
adjacent fire compartments the area of the fire door openings 
between such fire compartments may be increased to not more 
than 8.4m2 
5.21.1 
On any floor of a fire compartment not coming within occupancy 
group C 1 or C2, all fully enclosed tenancies, according to the fire 
risk classification of their occupancy as set out in clause 5.6, shall 
be separated by fire partitions having a F .R.R. of: 
(i) Y2 hour for a low risk occupancy other than a place of 
assembly 
(ii) 1 hour for a moderate fire risk occupancy or a place of 
assembly 
(iii) 1 lh hours for a high risk occupancy 
Partially enclosed or unenclosed tenancies are acceptable, 
provided egress routes are not affected: 
Provided that any separate tenancy with an independent entrance 
from a street or public place which exceeds 25% of the maximum 
area permitted under table 1 for a particular fire compartment 
shall be separated from other tenancies by fire partitions of double 
the F.R.R. provided for in items (I) and (ii) of this Subclause, 
which ever is applicable 
Provided also that the above provisions shall not apply to shops 
or show windows facing on to an arcade or shopping mall, if the 
entire area of that floor of the fire compartment is protected by an 
approved automatic sprinkler system. 
5.23.6 
Pipes or ducts shall be permitted to pass through fire walls, fire 
partitions, or fire rated floors as follows: 
(a) Pipes or ducts not exceeding 2 500m2 in cross sectional area 
- no additional protection required. 
(b) Pipes or ducts exceeding 2 500 mm2 but not exceeding 32 
000 mm2 in cross sectional area shall be made of or encased in 
a material having a melting point in excess of 1 000°C for a 
distance of at least six times the diameter or major dimension 
of the pipe or duct, on each side of the fire resisting barrier: 
Provided that such encasement shall not be required in buildings 
equipped with an approved automatic sprinkler system, or in 
areas which in the opinion of the engineer transmission of fire is 
unlikely or on the outside of any exterior wall or roof. 
5.24.4 
The requirements for fire partitions in any roof space as specified 
in 5.24.1, 5.24.2, and 5.24.3 shall not apply to the roof space of 
any fire compartment protected by an automatic sprinkler system. 
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5.27.2 
In all buildings that are not classified in clause 5.6 under groups 
B.l, B.2 and B.3, and that are not protected by an approved 
sprinkler system, all doors opening from a habitable room to a 
hallway or passageway forming part of the route of travel to an 
exitway shall be close fitting doors without ventilation, and all 
lights contiguous to the partition separating habitable rooms from 
such corridors or passageways shall be fixed sashes glazed with 6 
mm Georgian wired glass, or copper light glazing: 
Provided that the engineer may waive this requirement in special 
cases, such as prisons and other special purpose buildings, where 
he is satisfied that equivalent safety against smoke-logging of 
hallways and passageways is provided by such factors as 
continuos supervision and limitations on combustible contents. 
5.33.1 
One single unit exitway may discharge into the main exitway 
where there is a smoke stop door at the junction and where 
between the point of the junction and the point of exit to the 
street there is not more than one doorway on each side of the 
exitway; 
Provided that each such doorway gives access to the area beyond 
only through a smoke-stop lobby or, in the case where the area 
beyond is -protected by an approved sprinkler installation, by 
smoke-stop doors. 
5.55.1 
The owner of any existing building which does not comply with 
any or all of the relevant requirements of this bylaw for; 
(i) The separation of tenancies by fire partitions as set out in 
clause 5.21; 
(ii) Fire partitions enclosing vertical openings as set out in clause 
5.22; 
(iii) Surface finish of walls and ceilings (early fire hazard indices 
or flammability index as appropriate) as set out in clauses 5.25 
and 5.52; 
(iv) Means of egress as set out in clauses 5.27-5.54 inclusive; 
Shall, upon receipt of a written notice from the engineer and 
within the period stipulated therein, cause the building to cause 
the building to be bought to that degree of conformity with the 
requirements of this bylaw as may be stated in such notice, and 
until he has done so to the satisfaction of the engineer shall 
comply with any requirements as to the use of the building 
(including limitations on the numbers of persons to be permitted 
in the building at any time, limitations on type and amount of 
goods and chattels to be permitted in the building in the building, 
and other relevant limitations) that the engineer shall include in 
such notice. 
Provided that no extstmg building need comply with the 
requirements as in (I) and (iii) above if it is protected by an 
automatic fire sprinkler system, 
5.82.1 
Where a stage floor is raised or the ground under it is excavated 
to provide a usable space or space in which in the opinion of the 
engineer could be used for storage or other purposes, such floor 
shall be of materials and construction providing a 1 hr F.R.R., 
unless the whole of the area under the stage is protected by an 
approved automatic sprinkler installation. 
5.83.2 
All workshops, storerooms, scene docks, property rooms, 
wardrobe, or painting rooms, in connection with a theatre, shall 
be separated from the auditorium by the proscenium wall and 
from the stage area by a 2 hr. F.R.R. wall, and be separated from 
each other by fire partitions having a 1 hr. F.R.R. except that 
when an approved automatic sprinkler system installation is 
installed and the total area of the rooms so separated is not 
greater than 200m2 the F.R.R's may be halved (that is, 1 hr and 
1f2 hr. respectively). 
5.85.1 
For other than normal rooms the materials and construction 
surrounding all built in spaces which are provided with access of 
any nature, for example, trnder stairways, galleries, and similar 
areas, shall provide a 2 hr. F.RR.: 
Provided that where such spaces are protected by an approved 
automatic sprinkler installation with sprinkler heads spaced at 
approved distances, the F.R.R. shall be not less than 1f2 hr. 
5.88.3 
In addition to the requirements of clause 5.25, the following 
requirements shall be met; 
(i) All combustible lining material attached directly to the framing 
shall be backed by non combustible material provided that this 
requirement shall not apply to any materials comprising less 
than 5 %of the total sub divisions of a floor. 
(ii) The surface finish of walls and ceilings in main circulation 
corridors shall be restricted to materials having early fire 
hazard indices not higher than: 
Spread of flame index 2 
Smoke developed index 5 
Provided that where approved automatic fire sprinkler system 
is installed, the requirements for control of wall, ceiling and 
interior finishing materials need not apply. 
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Table 1 
FIRE COMPARTMENTS WITHOUT SPRINKLERS 
MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE AREAS, NUMBER OF STOREYS AND MINIMUM TYPE OF CONSTRUCTION 
REQUIRED IN FIRE COMPARTMENTS FOR VARIOUS OCCUPANCIES WITHOUT SPRINKLER PROTECTION 
Note: Clauses 5.3, 5.6, 5.8, 5.9, 5.10 and 5.16 will assist users in the application of this table 
Accommodation 
dwellings for: 
Persons under 
Low 
I 
2 
(b) 
2(a) 
(b) 
2 
2 
I k~~~ 
r-··~·-··-·-+ 
4 II 500 I 4 250 
3 
3 
;·············!·· L 
···············~~~~~-~~~~·· 
Storeys_ . _
1
.. . r_. ype __ s _of_ Construction 
--- · 1_ .. __ . __ ·-r -· · ---· 5- · ·-
2(a) / 5 
J 
(see clause 5.9.2.2) 
............ ~ ~-·········· . 
B.2 
B.3 
C. I 
Persons needing 
attention 
Normal Persons 
Low 
Low 
Low 
I 
(b) 
1500 I 
1200 (b) 
600 2(a) 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
4 
3 
3 
1200 I 4 
300 2(a) 4 
1500 1 3 
1200 2 3 
1000 (b) 3 
600 3 
600 
300 
(see clause 5.9.2.2) 
1 5 
2(a) 5 
1200' , (b) 2 1200 3 (see clause 5.9.2.2) 
l---·~~ ........... : ...... ~~~~,~~ .......... j, .... ,~~~-I ... - ............ Ji ..... ,~~-·~·"~~--~------1~~8~0~0 .. ,1 ...... ,~~L",,""J~~~--'3~-~-~~~~---~-~-~--c""'f""'"'""'""'""'~~-·~ 
C.2 Low As for B.3 (e) 300 As for B.3 
D.l 
D.2 
D.3 
unit dwellings 
Commercial and 
Industrial 
!Juildings 
Low 4000 
3000 
2000 
600 
1 
2 
(b) 
2(a) 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3000 
400 
4000 
3000 
2000 
I 
2(a) 
1 
2 
(b) 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
3 
(c) (e) but: Two 
(d) 
150 Two andY, 
(c) (d) 
800 
400 2 
See 
subclause 
5. 
Ditto Mod 3000 
2000 
1500 
500 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
3 
See subclause 5.9.2.2 
Ditto High 
2 
(b) 
2(a) 
1 
2 
2(a) 
1 
2 
(b) 
2 
Timber upper floor of y, hr. F.R.R. and lined throughout with material to provide a construction having a Y, hr F.R.R. and provided 
there is no place of assembly, as defined herein, on the upper floor 
(b) Number of storeys not limited by this table 
(c) Provided the engineer may allow a larger area if he is of the opinion that the separation distance, means of egress, and other 
considerations warrant. 
(d) Single unit dwellings only 
(e) But not less than the F.R.R. in clause 5.21.3 
See 5.9.2.2 
5 
5 
B. 
B.2 
D.1 
D.2 
D.3 
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Table lA 
dwellings for: Persons 
... -~~~!. ~~~~~~~~ .. 
Persons needing 
attention 
Persons 
Commercial and 
Industrial buildings 
FIRE COMPARTMENTS WITH SPRINKLERS 
MAXIMUM ALLOW ABLE AREAS, NUMBER OF STOREYS AND MINIMUM TYPE OF CONSTRUCTION 
REQUIRED IN FIRE COMPARTMENTS FOR VARIOUS OCCUPANCIES WITH SPRINKLER PROTECTION, BUT 
SUBJECT TO 5.10.4(b) 
Note: Clauses 5.3, 5.6, 5.8, 5.9, 5.10 and 5.16 will assist users in the application of this table 
Low 
Low 
Low 
Low 
1500 
1000 
800 
1200 
1000 
1500 
1200 
600 
1200 
1 
2 
(b) 
2(a) 
(b) 
1 ........ :. 
(b) 
1 
(b) 
2(a) 
3000 
2000 
1500 
1000 
1000 
1200 
1000 
1200 
300 
1 
2(a) 
1 
2(f) 
4(f) 
4 
4 
4 
300 
(c) 
150 
See 5.9.2.2 
See clause 5.9.2.2 
See clause 5.9.2.2 
See clause 5.9.2.2 
As 
hut; Two (d) 
Two aod a half 
(d)(e) 
See clause 
5.9.2.2 
Diit;;·······l···· Mod 
5 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Sec clause 5.9.2.2 
Ditto See clause 5.9.2.2 
Timber upper floor of y, hr. F.R.R. aud lined throughout with material to provide a constmction having a v, hr F.R.R. and provided 
there is no place of assembly, as defined herein, on !he upper floor 
(b) Number of storeys not limited by this table 
(c) Provided the engineer may allow a larger area if he is of the opinion that the separation distance, means of egress, and other 
considerations warrant. 
(d) Single unit dwellings only 
(<;l) IM not I.e~~ than t!w f.R..R. i\1 c[Q,u~e s.zu 
(f) Each floor above the ground floor shall have a l hr. F.R.R. except that a gallery or mezzanine floor and a floor wholly within a 
maisonette, may have% hr. F.R.R. 
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Canada 
Relationship Between the National Fire Code and the National 
Building Code 
NBC 
II establishes a satisfactory level of fire safety for the 
construction of new buildings or the reconstruction of old 
buildings 
NFC 
!!!!! establishes a satisfactory level for fire prevention, fire fighting 
and life safety in buildings 
National Building Code of Canada 
Part 3 Fire Protection, Occupant Safety and Accessibility 
3.1.5.4 Combustible glazing and Skylights 
4) The flame spread rating of combustible glazing is permitted to 
be not more than 150 if the aggregate area of the glazing is 
not more than 25% of the wall area of the storey in which it is 
located and 
a) the glazing is installed in a building not more than 1 
storey in building height, 
b) the glazing in the first storey is separated from the 
glazing in the second storey in accordance with the 
requirements of Article 3.2.3.16. for opening 
protection, or 
c) the building is sprinklered throughout 
3.1.5.5 Combustible Components for Exterior Walls 
1) Except for an exposing building face required to conform to 
Sentence 3.2.3.7(1) or Sentence 3.2.3.7(4), an exterior non 
loadbearing wall assembly that includes combustible 
component is permitted to be used in a building required to 
be of non combustible construction provided 
a) the building is 
i) not more than 3 storeys in building height 
or, 
ii) sprinklered throughout. 
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3.1.5.11 Combustible Insulation and its Protection 
3) Combustible insulation having a flame spread rating more than 
25 but not more than 500 on an exposed surface, or any 
surface that would be exposed by cutting through the material 
in any direction, is pennitted in the exterior walls of a building 
required to be of non combustible construction, provided the 
insulation is protected from adjacent spaces within the 
building, other than adjacent concealed spaces within the wall 
assemblies, by a thermal barrier as described in Sentence (2), 
except that in a building that is sprinklered throughout and is 
more than 18 m high, measured between grade and the floor 
level of the top storey, the insulation shall be protected by a 
thermal barrier consisting of 
a) not less than 12.7 mm thick gypsum board 
mechanically fastened to a supporting assembly 
independent of the insulation 
b) lath and plaster, mechanically fastened to a 
supporting insulation independent of the insulation, 
c) masonry 
d) concrete, or, 
e) any thermal barrier that meets the requirements of 
classification B when tested in confonnance with 
CAN4-S124-M "Standard Method of Test for the 
Evaluation of Protective Coverings for Foamed 
Plastic 
3.1.5.12 Combustible Elements in Partitions 
3) Solid lumber partitions not less than 38 mm thick and 
partitions containing wood framing are permitted to be used 
in a building required to be of non combustible construction 
provided 
a) the building is sprinklered throughout 
b) the partitions are not 
i) located in any care or detention occupancy 
ii) installed as enclosures for exits or vertical 
service spaces, or, 
iii) used to satisfy the requirements of Clause 
3.2.8.1.(1)(a). 
3 .1. 5.15 Combustible Piping Materials 
2) Combustible sprinkler piping is permitted to be used within a 
sprinklered floor area in a building required to be of non 
combustible construction 
3) Polypropylene pipes and fittings are permitted to be used for 
drain, waste and vent piping for the conveyance of highly 
corrosive materials and for piping used to distribute distilled 
or dialysed water in laboratory and hospital facilities in a 
building required to be of non combustible construction 
provided 
a) the building is sprinklered throughout 
b) the piping is not located in a vertical shaft, and, 
c) piping that penetrates a fire separation is sealed at 
the penetration by a fire stop system that when 
subjected to the fire test method in CAN4-S115-M, 
"Standard Method of Fire Tests of Firestop 
Systems", has an FT rating not less than the fire 
resistance rating of the fire Separation. 
3 .1. 8. 6 Maximum Openings 
1) The size of an opening in an interior fire separation required 
to be protected with a closure shall be not more than 11 m2, 
with no dimension more than 3. 7 m, if a fire compartment on 
either side of the fire separation is not sprinklered. 
2) The size of an opening in an interior fire separation required 
to be protected with a closure shall be not more than 22 m2, 
with no dimension more than 6 m, provided the fire 
compartments on both sides of the fire separation are 
sprinklered. 
3 .1. 9. 4 Combustible Piping Penetrations 
1) Combustible sprinkler piping is permitted to penetrate a fire 
separation provided the fire compartments on either side of 
the fire separation are sprinklered 
3.1.11.5 Fire Stopping of Roof Spaces, Balconies and 
Canopies 
1) A concealed space within a ceiling or roof assembly of 
combustible construction, including an attic or roof space, in 
which sprinklers are not installed, shall be separated by 
construction conforming to Article 3 .1.11. 7 into 
compartments not more than 
a) 600 m2 in area with no dimension more than 60 m if 
the exposed construction materials within the space 
have a flame spread rating of not more than 25, and 
b) 300m2 in area with no dimension more than 20m if 
the exposed constmction materials within the space 
have a flame spread rating of more than 25 
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3 .1.11. 6 Fire Stopping of Crawl Spaces 
1) A crawl space which is not considered as a basement by 
Article 3.2.2.9, and in which sprinklers are not installed, shall 
be separated by construction conforming to Article 3 .1.11. 7 
into compartments not more than 600 m2 with no dimension 
more than 3 0 m 
3.1.13.2 Flame Spread Rating 
1) Except as otherwise required or permitted by this sub section, 
the flame rating of the interior walls and ceiling finishes 
including glazing and skylights, shall be no more than 150 and 
shall conform to table 3.1.13.2 
Table 3.1.13.2 
Flame Spread Ratings 
Forming Part of Sentence 3.1.13.2.(1) 
Occupancy Location or Element Maximum Flame Spread Rating 
---~~---~~ .... ~ ............................... ~ ......... _ .. _____ ~...f()L:Y!tJ~~ .ctll.~ ~-~!_li_t1_g~ ........ ~ .... . 
Group A Division l occupancies, 
including doors, skylights, 
glazing and light diffusers and 
lenses 
Group B Occupancies 
EYJts 
Lobbies described in sentence 
3.4.4.2.(2) 
Covered vehicular passageways, 
except for roof assemblies of 
heavy timber construction in the 
3 .1.13. 7 High Buildings 
Sprinklered Not Sprinklered 
150 
150 
25 
25 
25 
25 
75 
75 
25 
25 
25 
25 
1) Except as permitted in Sentences (2) to ( 4), the interior wall, 
ceiling and floor finishes in a building regulated by the 
provision of Subsection 3.2.6 shall conform to the flame 
spread rating requirements in Article 3 .1.13 .2 and to the flame 
spread rating and smoke developed classification values in 
Table 3.1.13.7 
2) Except for a building of group B major occupancy and 
elevator cars, the flame spread rating and smoke developed 
classification of interior wall, floor and ceiling finishes need 
not conform to the values in Table 3 .. 1.13.7, providing the 
building is sprinklered throughout. 
3 .2.1.2. Storage Garage Considered as a Separate Building 
2) The exterior wall of a basement that is required to be a fire 
separation with a fire resistance rating in accordance with 
Sentence (1) is permitted to be penetrated by openings that 
are not protected by closures providing 
a) The storage garage is sprinklered throughout 
3.2.2.16 Heavy Timber Roof Permitted 
1) Unless otherwise permitted by Articles 3.2.2.20 to 3.2.2.83, a 
roof assembly in a building up to 2 storeys in building height 
is permitted to be of heavy timber construction regardless of 
the building area or type of construction required, providing 
the building is sprinklered throughout. 
3.2.3.15 Protection of Soffits 
1) Except as permitted in Sentences (3) or ( 4 ), where there is a 
common attic or roof space above more than 2 suites of a 
residential occupancy or above more than 2 patients' sleeping 
rooms, and the conmion attic or roof space projects beyond 
the exterior wall of the building, the soffit, and any opening in 
the soffit or other surface of the projection located within 2 
500 mm of a window or door opening shall be protected by 
a) non combustible material 
b) plywood not less than 11 mm thick 
c) lumber not less than 11 mm thick 
4) The protection required by Sentence (1) for projections is 
permitted to be omitted if 
a) the fire compartments behind the window and door 
openings are sprinklered in accordance with Article 
3.2.5.13, and, 
b) all rooms, including closets and bathrooms, having 
openings in the wall beneath the soffit are sprinklered 
3.2.5.9 Standpipe System Design 
5) The residual design pressure at the deign flow rate of the 
topmost hose connection of a standpipe system that is 
required to be installed in a building is permitted to be less 
than 690 kPa provided, 
a) the building is sprinklered throughout 
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3.3.1.4. Public Corridor Separations 
1) Except as otherwise required by this part or permitted by 
Sentences (2) to (7), a public corridor shall be separated from 
the remainder of the building by a fire separation having a fire 
resistance of not less than 1 hr. 
2) If a floor area is sprinklered throughout, no fire separation is 
required between a public corridor and the remainder of the 
floor area provided the public corridor 
(a) is more than 5 m unobstructed width, and 
(b) does not serve 
i) a care or detention occupancy 
ii) a residential occupancy 
3.3 .1.1 Separation of Suites 
3) Occupancies that are served by public corridors conforming to 
Section 3.3.1.4.(5) in a building that is sprinklered 
throughout, are not required to be separated by fire 
separations provided the occupancies are 
a) suites of business and personal services occupancies 
b) fast food, vending operations that do not provide 
seating for customers, and 
c) suites of mercantile occupancy 
3.3 .1. 4 Public Corridor· Separations 
3) If a floor area is sprinklered throughout, no fire resistance 
rating is required for a fire separation between a public 
corridor and the remainder of the floor area provided the 
corridor does not serve a care or detention occupancy or a 
residential occupancy 
4) If a floor area is sprinklered throughout, no fire separation is 
required between a public corridor and the remainder of the 
floor area provided the public corridor 
a) is more than 5 m in unobstructed width, and 
b) does not serve 
i) a care or detention occupancy, or 
ii) a residential occupancy 
5) If a floor area is sprinklered throughout, no fire separation is 
required between a room or a suite and a public corridor that 
serves it provided the public corridor complies with Sentence 
3.3.1.9.(6) (width and area) and Clause 3.4.2.5.(1)(d) (width 
and length) 
6) If a floor area is sprinklered throughout, no fire separation is 
required between a public corridor and a room containing 
water closets and lavatories provided the room and the public 
corridor are separated from the remainder of the floor area by 
a fire separation that has a fire resistance rating not less than 
that required between the public corridor and the remainder of 
the floor area. 
3. 3 .1. 5 Egress Doorways 
1) Except for dwelling units, a minimum of two egress doorways 
located so that one doorway could provide egress from the 
room or suite as required by Article 3.3 .1.3. if the other 
doorway becomes inaccessible to the occupants due to a fire 
which originates in the room or suite, shall be provided for 
every room and every suite 
c) in a floor area that is not sprinklered throughout, and 
i) the area of the room or suite is more than 
the value in Table 3 .3.1.5.A., or 
ii) the travel distance within the room or suite, 
to the nearest egress doorway, is more than 
the value in Table 3.3.1.5.A.,or 
d) in a floor area that is sprinklered throughout and 
does not contain a high hazard industrial occupancy 
and 
i) the travel distance to the egress doorway is 
more than 25 m, or 
ii) the area of the room or suite is more than 
the value in Table 3. 3 .1. 5 .B 
TABLE 3.3.1.5.A 
Egress in Floor area not Sprinklered Throughout 
Occupancy of 
Room or Suite 
Maximum Maximum 
area of Distance to 
Room or Egress 
----------------~~~~---,-,.~ - __ §~_~t~~-~-~~P.£~~y_ 
Group A 
Group C 
150 15 
100 15 
GroupD 200 
GroupE 150 
Group F Division 2 150 
g~()l!!? :J=I}?iyi~!~!l} ----------------· ~?? "'' --
TABLE 3.3.1.5.B. 
25 
15 
10 
1.5 
Egress in Floor Area Sprinklered Throughout 
Occupancy of Room or Maximum Area of 
Room or Suite Suite 
Group A 
. .. ... . .... . ............... -~. ·~·~· ~-~~-. ~~~~~ ........................ . 
Group B Division 1 
Group B Division 2 
Sleeping Area 
Group B Division 2 
Other the sleeping 
Group C 
GroupD 
GroupE 
Group F Division 2 
F Division 3 
200 
100 
100 
200 
150 
300 
200 
200 
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3.3.1.20. Janitors' Rooms 
3) The fire separation required by Sentence (1) is not required to 
have a fire resistance rating if the floor area in which the room 
orspaceissprrruderedthroughout 
3.3.1.21. Common Laundry Rooms 
3) The fire separation required by Sentence (1) is not required to 
have a fire resistance rating if the floor area in which the 
laundry room is located is sprinklered throughout. 
3.3.2.5. Corridors 
3) The fire resistance rating required by Sentence ( 1) is 
permitted to be waived if the floor area in which the corridor 
is located is sprinklered throughout 
3.3 .2.11. Libraries 
2) The fire separation required by Sentence (1) is not required if 
the book storage room is sprinklered 
3.3 .2.12. Stages for Theatrical Performances 
6) The fire separation referred to in Sentence (3) is not required 
between a stage and a seating area in a building that is 
sprinklered throughout, providing that a sprinkler deluge 
system is installed at the boundary between the stage and the 
seating area 
3.3 .4.2. Fire Separations 
4) The fire resistance rating of the fire separation required by 
Sentence 3.3.5.6.(1) is permitted to be waived if the fire 
separation is located between a dwelling unit and an attached 
storage garage containing no more than 5 vehicles, provided 
a) the dwelling unit and the attached storage garage are 
sprinklered 
3.3.5.9. Multiple Tenant Self Storage Warehouse 
1) Unless te building is sprinklered throughout, each individual 
tenancy in a multiple tenant self storage warehouse classified 
as an industrial occupancy shall be separated from the 
remainder of the building by a fire separation have a fire 
resistance rating not less than 45 min. 
3.4.2.4. Travel Distance 
2) The travel distance from a suite or room not within a suite is 
permitted to be measured from an egress door of the suite or 
room to the nearest exit provided 
a) the suite or room is separated from the remainder of 
the floor by a fire separation 
i) having a fire resistance rating not less than 
45 min. in a floor area that IS not 
spri.nklered throughout, or 
ii) which is not required to have a fire 
resistance rating in a floor area that is 
sprinklered throughout. 
3.4.2.5. Location of Exits 
1) Except as permitted by sentences (2), (3) and 3.3.2.4.(6), if 
more than one exit is required from a floor area, the exits shall 
be located so that the travel distance to at least one exit shall 
not be more than 
a) 25m in a high hazard occupancy 
b) 40 m in a business and personal services occupancy 
c) 45 min a floor area that contains an occupancy other 
than a high hazard industrial occupancy, provided it 
is sprinklered throughout, 
d) 105 min any floor area served by a public corridor, 
in which rooms and suites are not separated from the 
remainder of the floor area by a fire separation, 
provided 
iii) the building is sprink:lered throughout 
3.4.4.2. Exits through Lobbies 
2) Not more than one exit from a floor area is permitted to lead 
through a lobby provided 
e) the lobby conforms to the requirements for exits, 
except that 
iii) the fire separation between the lobby and 
adjacent occupancies that are permitted to 
open onto the lobby need not have a fire 
resistance rating provided the lobby and the 
adjacent occupancies are sprink:lered 
3.4.6.16. Security for Banks and Mercantile Floor Areas 
1) If a building is sprinklered throughout, the requirements of 
Sentence 3.4.6.15.(1) (Internal Release) are permitted to be 
waived for exit and egress doors complying with Sentence (2) 
to (9) that serve a floor area or part of a floor area used 
exclusively for 
a) a bank, or 
b) the sale of retail merchandise 
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3.6.2.2. Waiver of Fire Separations 
2) The fire separation required by Sentence 3.6.2.1.(5) need not 
be provided if the service room is located in a floor area that 
is sprinklered throughout. 
National Fire Code of Canada (1995) 
3.6.2.4 Baled Combustible Fibres 
1) Except as permitted in Sentences (2), (3) and (4), bales 
combustible fibres shall be stored so that 
a) no individual storage area exceeds 250 m2 
b) the height of any storage in an individual storage 
area does not exceed 4.5 m 
c) subsidiary aisles within individual storage areas are 
not less than 1 m wide and, 
d) the clearance between piles and building walls is not 
less than 1m 
1) Except as permitted in Sentence (4), where bales combustible 
fibres are stored in sprinklered buildings, the maximum area 
of any individual storage area shall be 500 m2 
2) Where baled raw pulp is stored in an unsprinklered building 
a) the maximum area of any individual storage area 
shall be 500 m2, and 
b) the mmdmum height of storage shall be 6 m 
1) where baled raw pulp is stored in a sprinklered building 
a) the maximum area of any individual storage area 
shall be 1000 m2, and 
b) the maximum height of storage shall be 6 m 
3.2.7.9. Fire Suppression Systems 
1) Except as permitted in Sentences (2) and (3) and in Part 4, 
buildings used for the storage of dangerous goods regulated 
by this subsection shall be equipped throughout with a 
sprinkler or other fire suppression system, designed in 
conformance with Part 6 and good engineering practice with 
respect to specific dangerous goods. 
2) Buildings described in Sentence (1) need not be equipped 
throughout with a sprinkler or other fire suppression system 
provided that 
a) the sum of the individual storage areas in the 
building used for the storage of dangerous goods, other 
than Class 9 dangerous goods with no other 
classification and those covered in Part 4 of this code, 
does not exceed 100m2, and 
b) the dangerous goods are 
i) separated in conformance with Table 
3.2.7.6., and 
ii) stored in fire compartments separated 
from the remainder of the building by a fire 
separation having a fire resistance rating of not 
less than 2 hr. 
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3.2.8.2 Flammable Gasses 
2) Cylinders of Class 2.1 flammable, lighter than air gasses are 
permitted to be stored outside of a room described in 
Sentence (1) provided that, 
a) in an unsprinklered building of combustible 
construction, the aggregate capacity of expanded gas 
outside of the room is not more than 60m3, and 
b) in a sprinklered building, or in a building of non-
combustible construction, the aggregate capacity of 
expanded gas outside of the room is not more than 170 
m3 
4.2.5.1. Maximum Quantities 
1) Except as provided in Sentence (5), the quantities of 
flammable liquids and combustible liquids stored in 
mercantile occupancies shall not exceed those in Sentences 
(2) to (4) 
2) In unsprinklered mercantile occupancies, the maximum 
quantity of flammable liquids and combustible liquids 
permitted to be stored in a single suite shall be the lesser of 
a) 8 L/m3 of the total area in the suit, provided that 
more than 2 L/m3 is Class I Liquid, of which not more 
than 0.3 L/m3 shall be Class IA, Class IB, or any 
combination of these 2 classes, or 
b) 8 000 L, provided that not more than 2 000 L is 
Class I Liquid, of which not more than 300 L shall be 
Class IA, Class IB, or any combination of these 2 
classes. 
1) In sprinklered mercantile occupancies, the maximum 
quantities of flammable liquids and combustible liquids 
permitted to be stored in a single suite shall be the lesser of 
a) 24 L/m3 of the total area in the suit, provided that 
more than 6 L/m3 is Class I Liquid, of which not more 
than 0.3 L/m3 shall be Class IA, Class IB, or any 
combination of these 2 classes, or 
b) 24 000 L, provided that not more than 6 000 L is 
Class I Liquid, of which not more than 1 000 L shall be 
Class IA, Class IB, or any combination of these 2 classes 
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